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BRANDON HASBROUCK* 
Notwithstanding the extent to which scholars, lawyers, and community 
organizers are broadening their contestations of the criminal justice sys-
tem, they have paid insufficient attention to federal sentencing regimes. 
Part of the reason for this is that sentencing is a “back-end” criminal 
justice problem and much of our nation’s focus on criminal justice issues 
privileges “front-end” problems like policing. Another explanation might 
be that the rules governing sentencing are complex and cannot be easily 
rearticulated in the form of political soundbites. Yet sentencing regimes 
are a criminal justice domain in which inequalities abound—and in ways 
that raise profound questions about fairness, due process, and justice. 
This is particularly true regarding the draconian conditions placed on 
federal prisoners’ abilities to challenge their unlawful sentences under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
A federal prisoner’s sentence is unlawful when courts—the Supreme 
Court or a controlling circuit court—wrongly interpret a statute that signifi-
cantly enhanced the prisoner’s sentencing range. After the person is sen-
tenced and files a direct appeal and initial 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the 
court corrects its errors and determines that correction to be retroactive. 
The federal prisoner returns to the sentencing court and requests to be sen-
tenced under the correct, unenhanced sentencing range, as the original sen-
tence is no longer authorized by law. There is a deep circuit split regarding 
whether federal prisoners may seek post-conviction relief for these sentenc-
ing claims under the savings clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)—the procedural 
vehicle that allows federal prisoners access to the court to challenge an 
unlawful sentence under the general habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
This Article’s significance is twofold. First, because courts have strug-
gled to discern the meaning of the savings clause, this Article provides a 
text-based interpretation of section 2255(e) that is grounded in the stat-
ute’s text and is consistent with its structure and purpose. Second, this 
Article proposes a doctrinal test that courts should adopt in analyzing 
sentencing claims brought under the savings clause. Specifically, this 
Article proposes that relief under the savings clause is appropriate when 
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the claim relies on a retroactively applicable decision of statutory inter-
pretation, the claim was foreclosed by binding precedent at the time of 
the initial section 2255 motion, and the claim involves a fundamental 
defect in the sentence. This Article contends that any error that alters the 
statutory range Congress prescribed for punishment—the ceiling or the 
floor—raises separation of powers and due process concerns and is thus 
a fundamental defect in criminal proceedings. In short, federal prisoners 
should be able to access courts to raise their sentencing claims consistent 
with this Article’s proposal.   
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“There is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a 
point where it ought properly never to repose.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Inmates are sitting in federal prisons serving unlawful sentences.2 
The Department of Justice estimated that in 2015 (the latest year for which it has published 
statistics), there were 328,500 people in federal correctional custody. See Danielle Kaeble & Lauren 
Glaze, BUREAU of JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2015, at 12 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8DPZ-9NH7]. 
Many will 
die in those prisons serving “unjust” sentences.3 Nonetheless, some courts have 
held, wrongly, that these federal prisoners are foreclosed from any avenue of 
post-conviction relief under the habeas savings clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), thus 
depriving “the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restora-
tion, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which 
does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”4 In so doing, these courts argu-
ably render the savings clause a nullity in violation of the Suspension Clause of 
the United States Constitution—the constitutional provision that guarantees that 
the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended absent narrow circumstances.5 
Section 2255 includes the congressionally created statutory remedy for fed-
eral prisoners to challenge the validity of their convictions and sentences after 
their convictions become final.6 Because Congress imposed “a litany of draco-
nian conditions on prisoners’ ability to challenge their convictions” through a 
successive section 2255 motion, federal prisoners turn to the general habeas 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to seek relief from their conviction and, in some 
cases, their subsequent sentence.7 “Congress explicitly allowed some prisoners 
1. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
2. 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 269 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), 
reh’g granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015) (explaining that the district court was “required to 
impose a life sentence” even though “it was [] unjust”) . 
4. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)). 
5. The Suspension Clause provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012); see also Leah M. Litman, Judge Gorsuch and Johnson Resentencing 
(This Is Not a Joke), 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 67, 67 (2017) (explaining that section 2255 “is the 
congressionally-created post-conviction remedy for federal prisoners”). 
7. Litman, supra note 6, at 68–70. 
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to do just that”8 in federal cases with the savings clause, section 2255(e).9 
Specifically, this provision allows a federal prisoner to file a petition for federal 
habeas corpus pursuant to section 2241, when the “remedy” provided by sec-
tion 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”10 
Thus, in essence, the savings clause is an important lynchpin in our constitu-
tional structure: it ensures that there must be an adequate substitute procedure 
for habeas corpus—the principle that prisoners must have a meaningful oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that they are being held pursuant to an erroneous applica-
tion or interpretation of relevant law—to be in compliance with the Suspension 
Clause.11 
The question presented in this Article—whether sentencing errors can be pur-
sued under the savings clause, section 2255(e)—goes to the heart of the integrity, 
fairness, and credibility of our criminal justice system.12 The answer, which finds 
support in the text, purpose, and history of the savings clause, must be yes. Yet, 
as demonstrated by two recent cases, courts have struggled to interpret the sav-
ings clause. 
Raymond Surratt Jr. pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine when he 
was thirty-one years old.13 Surratt was sentenced to a mandatory minimum life 
term.14 Everyone agreed Surratt’s sentence was unjust—the government, the dis-
trict court, and the public15
See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow, All Agree His Sentence Was Too Harsh, but He May Still Stay 
Locked up Forever, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/ 
all-agree-his-sentence-was-too-harsh-but-he-may-still-stay-locked-up-forever/2016/03/22/0d34aea2- 
ed3e-11e5-bc08-3e03a5b41910_story.html?utm_term=.ae57c2646c83. 
—because the Fourth Circuit wrongly interpreted the 
requirements for a predicate felony for an enhanced sentence under the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA).16 That correction came after Surratt was sen-
tenced and filed his direct appeal and first section 2255 motion.17 Under the 
correct interpretation, Surratt’s sentencing range was twenty years to life impris-
onment, not a mandatory life term.18 The district court made clear during 
Surratt’s sentencing that if the court had discretion, the court would have likely 
sentenced Surratt to twenty years because a life sentence was “undeserved and 
8. Id. at 70. 
9. See Prousalis v. Moore, 751 F.3d 272, 275 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating that a prisoner “may file a 
habeas petition under § 2241 only if the collateral relief typically available under § 2255 ‘is inadequate 
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e))). 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
11. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). 
12. I share Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s deep concern that many people already, including myself, lack 
confidence in the criminal justice system. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–71 (2016) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Until . . . voices [of people of color] matter too, our justice system will 
continue to be anything but.”). 
13. United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 270 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g 
granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015). 
14. Id. at 244 (majority opinion). 
15. 
16. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2012). 
17. Surratt, 797 F.3d at 244–46. 
18. Id. at 269 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)). 
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unjust.”19 Surratt pursued habeas relief via the savings clause in the form of re- 
sentencing.20 A divided panel on the Fourth Circuit said that “its hands [were] 
tied because Surratt received ‘only’ a life sentence, and not more than the statu-
tory maximum.”21 A stinging dissent followed by Judge Roger L. Gregory, con-
tending that “[b]y foreclosing any avenue for post-conviction relief, the majority 
essentially punishes Surratt for not having received the death penalty.”22 Before 
the Fourth Circuit could address this issue en banc, President Barack Obama 
commuted Surratt’s sentence, mooting the appeal.23 
In McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., the maximum 
sentence that Dan Carmichael McCarthan could serve—based on his conviction 
for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)—was 
ten years.24 The district court, however, sentenced him to seventeen years 
and seven months, concluding that he was eligible for an enhanced sentence 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).25 The court based its conclu-
sion, in part, on the district court’s determination—supported by then-existing 
precedent26—that McCarthan’s previous conviction for walk-away escape was 
a “crime of violence” under the ACCA, and thus qualified as one of the three 
predicate convictions that justified the sentencing enhancement.27 After 
the district court adjudicated McCarthan’s section 2255 motion, the Supreme 
Court held in Chambers v. United States that walk-away escape is not a crime 
of violence.28 Chambers therefore confirmed that there was never a legal 
basis for the sentence—seven years and seven months above the statutory 
maximum—the district court imposed on McCarthan. At this point, the only 
procedural vehicle available to McCarthan to have his sentence corrected by 
the district court was the savings clause, § 2255(e). 
Federal circuit courts are split on whether these sentencing-error claims can be 
pursued under the savings clause. In particular, the circuits are divided on 
19. Id. 
20. See id. at 244 (majority opinion). 
21. Id. at 269–70 (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
22. Id. at 270. 
23. See United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 2017). 
24. 851 F.3d 1076, 1080 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017). 
25. Id. 
26. See id.; United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the reasoning 
of these courts and now hold that a prior escape conviction qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’ under the 
career offender guideline.” (citation omitted)), abrogated by United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
27. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1080. McCarthan had three prior felony convictions: “(1) a 1987 
conviction in Florida for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver; (2) a 1992 conviction in 
Florida for escape; and (3) a 1994 conviction in Florida for third-degree murder.” Id. at 1120. At the 
time of sentencing, there was a mandatory-minimum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment if the 
defendant “ha[d] three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, 
committed on occasions different from one another.” See 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) (2012). Had the escape 
conviction not counted as a “crime of violence,” the mandatory minimum sentence would not have been 
triggered. 
28. 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009) (holding that some forms of the crime of escape do not qualify as a 
“violent felony” under ACCA (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii))). 
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whether, and under what circumstances, federal prisoners can resort to the sav-
ings clause when they are serving an enhanced sentence that is no longer author-
ized by law. The Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits routinely deny relief 
to federal prisoners seeking habeas relief in the form of resentencing.29 Those 
courts have interpreted section 2255(e) to provide relief—if at all—only in rare 
cases, such that a person can show that they are actually innocent of the underly-
ing crime.30 Consequently, habeas petitions that claim only sentencing errors— 
no matter how egregious those errors are—often fail because courts lack jurisdic-
tion to consider them. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have concluded that some 
sentencing errors can be addressed under the savings clause. Even still, this 
review only occurs in those instances in which the current sentence falls outside 
of the maximum sentence allowable under law or “shares similarities with serv-
ing a sentence imposed above the statutory maximum.”31 Additionally, the 
Fourth Circuit recently held that a sentencing claim can be addressed if the sen-
tence presents an “error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.”32 
Because McCarthan was sentenced in the Eleventh Circuit rather than, for 
example, the Seventh Circuit, he was denied any relief.33 There is little doubt that 
he would have been released from prison long ago had he been sentenced in the 
Seventh Circuit. Instead, McCarthan was imprisoned for seven years and seven 
months longer than Congress authorized. Whether McCarthan was entitled to any 
remedy for this injustice should not have been determined based on the circuit in 
which he was sentenced. Moreover, it appears that only the Fourth Circuit would 
consider Surratt’s claim because, although there was a significant mistake in the 
mandatory minimum baseline—life imprisonment instead of twenty years—his 
sentence remains within the statutory guidelines range Congress authorized: 
twenty years to life imprisonment. 
In an effort to resolve this deep circuit split, this Article does two important 
things. First, this Article provides a text-based interpretation of section 2255(e) 
that is grounded in the statute’s text and consistent with its structure and pur-
pose.34 To date, courts have struggled to interpret or give any substantive 
29. See Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102–03 (3d Cir. 2017); McCarthan, 851 
F.3d at 1079–80; Bradford v. Tamez, 660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Prost v. Anderson, 
636 F.3d 578, 584–86 (10th Cir. 2011). 
30. See, e.g., Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We therefore hold 
that the savings clause of § 2255 applies to a claim (i) that is based on a retroactively applicable 
Supreme Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent 
offense and (ii) that was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in 
the petitioner’s trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.” (emphasis added)). 
31. Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 599 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 
587–88 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a miscarriage of justice occurs when a federal prisoner’s sentence 
“exceed[s] that permitted by law”). 
32. United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018). 
33. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1100. 
34. Textualism is a method of statutory interpretation that aims to construe statutes according to the 
plain or ordinary meaning of the text. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory 
Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157, 204 (2018). Although there is debate amongst jurists and scholars on 
what the best method of statutory interpretation is or should be, the Supreme Court has repeatedly made 
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meaning to the savings clause.35 Second, based on that interpretation, this 
Article proposes a workable doctrinal test that courts should adopt in analyz-
ing sentencing claims brought under the savings clause. Specifically, this 
Article proposes that relief under the savings clause is appropriate when the 
claim relies on a retroactively applicable decision of statutory interpretation, 
the claim was foreclosed by binding precedent at the time of the initial sec-
tion 2255 motion, and the claim involves a fundamental defect in the sen-
tence. This Article contends that any error that alters the statutory range 
Congress prescribed for punishment—the ceiling or the floor—raises separa-
tion of powers and due process concerns and is thus a fundamental defect in the 
criminal proceedings. In these instances, federal prisoners—like McCarthan 
and Surratt—should have the ability to seek relief under the habeas savings 
clause, as that clause is a tool meant to be available to any persons who find 
themselves in prison when they ought not to be there.36 
Ultimately, although this Article takes the position that its interpretive frame-
work is workable, I predict that courts will continue to take a case-by-case 
approach to this issue, unless and until the Supreme Court addresses the current 
circuit split. In other words, courts prefer to resolve the cases before them as nar-
rowly as possible instead of creating broad rules. Courts are concerned with the fi-
nality of judgments and judicial expediency; a broad rule may open the 
proverbial floodgates to collateral attack on sentences.37 Those concerns are 
clear that “[s]tatutory interpretation [always] begins with the text.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 
(2016) (citing Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010)). In any event, the 
interpretive outcome advanced in this Article is likely under any method of statutory interpretation 
because the statute’s text, structure, and purpose all support this Article’s interpretation of the savings 
clause. 
35. Compare Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584–86 (10th Cir. 2011) (interpreting the savings 
clause to not allow any relief for actual innocence claims or sentencing claims), with Gardner v. Warden 
Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102–03 (3d Cir. 2017) (interpreting the savings clause to conclude that 
only actual innocence claims are cognizable), and Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429 (interpreting the savings 
clause to allow both actual innocence and sentencing claims). 
36. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016) (“A conviction or sentence imposed in 
violation of a substantive rule is not just erroneous but contrary to law and, as a result, void. It follows, 
as a general principle, that a court has no authority to leave in place a conviction or sentence that violates 
a substantive rule, regardless of whether the conviction or sentence became final before the rule was 
announced.” (citation omitted)). 
37. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1334 (11th Cir. 2011) (Martin, J., dissenting) 
(“Finality is valued in our system insofar as it promotes certain principles: (1) to build confidence in the 
integrity of the judicial system; (2) to minimize administrative costs and delay; (3) to avoid spoilation of 
evidence; and (4) to honor comity.” (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.11 (1979))); 
Prost, 636 F.3d at 582–83 (“The principle of finality, the idea that at some point a criminal conviction 
reaches an end, a conclusion, a termination, ‘is essential to the operation of our criminal justice 
system.’” (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989))); see also Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184 n.11 
(1979) (“[I]ncreased volume of judicial work associated with the processing of collateral attacks 
inevitably impairs and delays the orderly administration of justice. Because there is no limit on the time 
when a collateral attack may be made, evidentiary hearings are often inconclusive and retrials may be 
impossible if the attack is successful.” (citation omitted)); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and 
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451–53 (1963) (discussing the 
benefits of finality, including the “conservation of resources,” efficiency, and deterrence credibility in 
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real.38 But, such concerns should not take precedence over justice. And, 
justice requires resorting to the savings clause to correct fundamental sen-
tencing errors. Any other interpretations of the habeas savings clause, this 
Article argues, likely violate the Suspension Clause of the United States 
Constitution. 
After all, the fairness, integrity, and legitimacy of the judicial system is seri-
ously undermined—if not permanently damaged—when courts deny federal 
prisoners the right to pursue meritorious challenges to their unlawful detention. 
Therefore, unless and until the Supreme Court resolves the current circuit split 
in favor of allowing sentencing claims to proceed through the habeas savings 
clause, we must ask: “what reasonable citizen wouldn’t bear a rightly dimin-
ished view of the judicial process and its integrity if courts refused to correct 
obvious errors of their own devise that threaten to require individuals to linger 
longer in federal prison than the law demands?”39 
The discussion below proceeds as follows. Part I of this Article discusses the 
statutory background of the savings clause. There, this Article reviews the devel-
opment of section 2255 and discusses how the provisions of section 2255 interact. 
Though other scholars have broadly described this statutory framework, my 
account will put these dimensions of this area of law into sharp relief. Part II pro-
vides an overview of the current circuit split. As I will explain, central to this split 
is the question over the meaning of the savings clause. Part III provides a text- 
based interpretation of section 2255(e) that is grounded in the statute’s text and 
consistent with its purpose and structure. Based on this interpretation, I propose a 
doctrinal test to address sentencing claims. Part IV argues that there are serious 
constitutional concerns when courts wrongly interpret a federal statute that results 
in a sentencing ceiling or floor increase, such as an increased mandatory- 
minimum sentence. Finally, Part V discusses United States v. Surratt and applies 
this Article’s proposal to those facts. Surratt deserves more discussion for two 
criminal law). None of these principles are advanced, in my view, in denying federal prisoners’ relief 
from unlawful sentences. Consider Judge Martin’s dissent in Gilbert: 
First, denying relief does not build confidence in our court system because this looks to the 
world like a court refusing to acknowledge or make amends for its own mistake. Second, to 
the extent that there have been administrative costs and delay in considering [the federal 
prisoner’s] request for relief, they have already been incurred and [the court] need only grant 
him that relief to end [the federal prisoner’s] very expensive incarceration. 
640 F.3d at 1334 (Martin, J., dissenting); see also Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 712 (8th Cir. 
2011) (Melloy, J., dissenting) (“I find the sole justification for the majority’s holding today to be an 
uncompelling and unjust denial of process resting on hollow claims of a need to promote finality.”). 
“Third, because the only issue before [the court] is a purely legal one, there is no evidence that [courts] 
must consult.” Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1334 (Martin, J., dissenting). “And finally,” these cases present “no 
comity concerns insofar as [federal prisoners seek] to correct a sentence imposed in federal court and not 
by the state.” Id. 
38. See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1337 (Hill, J., dissenting) (“I recognize that without finality there can be 
no justice. But it is equally true that, without justice, finality is nothing more than a bureaucratic 
achievement.”). 
39. See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1908 (2018) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333–34 (10th Cir. 2014)). 
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reasons. First, the case highlights that not only does a sentence above the statutory 
maximum present a fundamental defect—any error that alters the statutory range 
Congress prescribed for punishment is a fundamental defect, as explained below. 
Second, and equally as important, is that people with claims similar to Surratt’s 
are still sitting in prison serving unlawful sentences. 
I. THE “SAVINGS CLAUSE” 
“The writ of habeas corpus is of such fundamental importance to this nation’s 
legal system that it is known as the Great Writ.”40 In the Framers’ view, “freedom 
from unlawful restraint [i]s a fundamental precept of liberty.”41 The “vital instru-
ment to secure that freedom” was the writ of habeas corpus.42 For this reason, 
contained in the very blueprint of our nation—the Constitution—is the prohibi-
tion on suspension of the writ.43 Specifically, at the constitutional convention, the 
Framers decided not to include an affirmative guarantee of the writ of habeas cor-
pus, but instead a provision that prohibited the writ’s suspension.44 A few years 
later in its first session, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, section 14 of 
which granted federal courts the power to issue habeas writs and is codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C § 2241.45 Congress bestowed on “the courts broad remedial 
powers to secure the historic office of the writ.”46 
Congress amended section 2241 several times, including in 1948.47 The 1948 
recodification added section 2255 to the statutory scheme, which provided a new 
motion by which federal prisoners could seek post-conviction relief, separate and 
apart from an application for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2241.48 The 
main impetus for section 2255 was to address concerns that federal courts located 
near prisons were flooded by petitions from prisoners who, until that point, were 
40. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1113 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807)), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017). 
41. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008). 
42. See id. 
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
44. See id.; Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process, and the 
Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 
1370–72 (2010) (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1987, at 438 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (discussing the debate over habeas corpus and the Suspension Clause at the 
Constitutional Convention)). 
45. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C § 2241 
(2012)). The “[p]ower to issue the writ of habeas corpus, the most celebrated writ in the English law, 
was granted to the federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789.” United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 
210 (1952) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). In Hayman, the Supreme Court reviewed 
the reasons for passage of § 2255. Id. The Court recognized the role of section 2241 for those cases in 
which section 2255 cannot provide relief, stating that “[i]n a case where the Section 2255 procedure is 
shown to be ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ the Section provides that the habeas corpus remedy [in § 2241] 
shall remain open to afford the necessary hearing.” Id. at 223. 
46. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776. 
47. See Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1056–58 (11th Cir. 2003) (providing the legislative 
history of post-conviction relief statutes). 
48. See id. at 1056. 
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required by section 2241 to apply for writs in the district of their confinement.49 
In this way, section 2255 “replaced traditional habeas corpus for federal prisoners 
. . . with a process that allowed the prisoner to file a motion with the sentencing 
court.”50 Importantly, the Supreme Court has confirmed on several occasions that 
section 2255 was never meant to abridge the writ, but was simply crafted to 
address practical concerns of habeas administration.51 
The 1948 amendments also gave birth to the so-called “savings clause” found 
in section 2255(e). This section provides that a federal prisoner may not apply for 
the traditional writ of habeas corpus under section 2241 unless the remedy under 
section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [] detention.”52 
The full text reads as follows: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is 
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be 
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by 
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him 
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or inef-
fective to test the legality of his detention.53 
Legislative history provides hardly any explanation for the inclusion of this 
language.54 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has described the sav-
ings clause as ensuring that subsequently enacted limitations in section 2255, 
described below, do not run afoul of the Suspension Clause.55 As a result of these 
49. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 210–13 (“These practical problems have been greatly aggravated by the 
fact that the few District Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction major federal penal institutions are 
located were required to handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions . . . .”). 
50. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 774. 
51. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974) (“Th[e] [legislative] history makes clear 
that § 2255 was intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas 
corpus.”); id. at 344 (“Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon 
prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions.”); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 
(1962) (“[I]t conclusively appears from the historic context in which § 2255 was enacted that the 
legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with 
that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner 
was confined.” (footnote omitted)); Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219 (“Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 
do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions.”); 
see also In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332–33 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing the practical problems, including 
“the large number of habeas petitions filed in districts containing federal correctional facilities” (citing 
Hyman, 342 U.S. at 212–14)). Congress’s “purpose and effect” in enacting section 2255, therefore, “was 
not to restrict access to the writ but to make postconviction proceedings more efficient.” Boumediene, 
553 U.S. at 775. 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012). 
53. Id. 
54. See Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1240–42 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Unfortunately, we have found 
nothing in the legislative history explaining why the relevant language was changed or what the new 
language means.”), overruled by McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 
1076 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
55. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776 (“The Court placed explicit reliance upon [the savings clause] 
in upholding [section 2255] against constitutional challenges.” (citation omitted)); see also Hayman, 
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collective 1948 amendments, “the § 2255 motion has displaced the writ of habeas 
corpus under § 2241 as the basic collateral remedy for persons confined pursuant 
to a federal criminal conviction.”56 
The next significant statutory habeas amendments occurred with the 1996 pas-
sage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Congress 
accomplished two important things in AEDPA. First, although AEDPA imposed 
new restrictions on federal prisoners’ ability to file multiple section 2255 motions 
challenging their convictions and sentences,57 those restrictions merely “statutorily 
codified the abuse of writ doctrine,” a common law doctrine designed to prevent the 
abuse of habeas corpus.58 Specifically, as the Supreme Court has told us, AEDPA 
was concerned with preventing “habeas-by-sandbagging” and repeated re-litigation 
of the same claims.59 Indeed, in section 2255(h), Congress expressly permitted fed-
eral prisoners to file successive petitions to challenge the legality of their convictions 
or sentences in either of the following circumstances: through new evidence of fac-
tual innocence or through a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law.60 
Second, and paramount, Congress, re-codified the saving clause as a new statu-
tory subsection in AEDPA, “leaving open a safety valve for federal prisoners ‘to 
test the legality of [their] detention’ where Section 2255, as revised, proved ‘inad-
equate or ineffective’—including where they had been ‘denied . . . relief’ on an 
earlier Section 2255 motion.”61 In other words, Congress left intact the habeas 
savings clause in section 2255(e) as a residual source of authority for federal 
post-conviction relief, which “entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to 
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or inter-
pretation’ of relevant law.”62 Thus, section 2255 continues to preserve the core 
function of habeas review, which is to provide prisoners a meaningful opportu-
nity to challenge illegal convictions or sentences.63 
In sum, sections 2255(e), 2255(h), and 2241 interact in the following way: A 
federal prisoner may challenge his sentence by filing a motion under section 
2255.64 After this first section 2255 motion, the prisoner must seek leave to file a  
342 U.S. at 223 (declining to “reach constitutional questions” regarding section 2255 based on the 
presence of the savings clause). 
56. 7 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.9(a) (3d ed. 2007). 
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012). 
58. Muniz v. United States, 236 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2001). 
59. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180–86 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted) (stating that AEDPA promotes comity between state and federal courts by ensuring that the 
state’s consideration of a petitioner’s claims are the “main event” rather than a “tryout on the road” to 
federal court (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977))); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 
651, 664 (1996) (“The Act also codifies some of the pre-existing limits on successive petitions . . . .”). 
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)–(2). 
61. See Brief for Amicus Curiae the Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner at 4, McCarthan v. 
Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017) (No. 17-85), 2017 WL 3531410 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)). 
62. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)). 
63. See Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 421 (2013). 
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
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second one under section 2255(h), by the procedures set forth in § 2244.65 Relief 
via the traditional writ of habeas corpus, authorized by section 2241, is not avail-
able unless the mechanism provided under section 2255 proves to be “inadequate 
or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.”66 
Although the history, purpose, and text of the savings clause is relatively clear, 
federal circuit courts are divided on whether sentencing errors fall under the sav-
ings clause. 
II. THE SPLIT: CIRCUIT COURTS DISAGREE ON WHETHER SENTENCING ERRORS ARE 
COGNIZABLE UNDER THE SAVINGS CLAUSE 
Most federal circuits agree—with the exception of the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits—that actual innocence claims67 are cognizable under the savings clause, 
assuming specific procedural requirements are met.68 However, there is a solid 
split between circuits on whether any sentencing error can pass through the ha-
beas savings clause.69 The Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have  
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (referring to section 2244). 
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
67. For an excellent discussion concerning actual innocence and habeas law, see generally Leah M. 
Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417 (2018) (distinguishing legal 
innocence from factual innocence and explaining “how the existing federal habeas system can provide 
relief to legally innocent defendants”). 
68. Compare Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that actual innocence 
claims may be pursed under the savings clause), Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(same), Christopher v. Miles, 342 F.3d 378, 382–83 (5th Cir. 2003) (same), In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 
333–34 (4th Cir. 2000) (same), In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611–12 (7th Cir. 1998) (same), 
Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377, 380 (2d Cir. 1997) (same), and In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 
245, 248 (3d Cir. 1997) (same), with McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 
1076, 1079–80 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017), and Prost v. 
Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584–86 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that actual innocence claims are not 
cognizable under the savings clause). 
69. Although the Second and Eighth Circuits have not directly weighed in on whether sentencing 
errors are cognizable under the savings clause, it appears that some courts in those circuits would limit 
relief to actual innocence claims based on existing precedent. In other words, those courts have not had 
occasion to have that issue briefed, argued, and decided. See, e.g., Dhinsa v. Krueger, 917 F.3d 70, 81 
(2d Cir. 2019) (“We have interpreted the savings clause of subsection (e) to authorize a § 2241 petition 
only when § 2255 is unavailable and the petition is filed by an individual who (1) can prove actual 
innocence on the existing record, and (2) could not have effectively raised [his] claim[] of innocence at 
an earlier time, perhaps due to an intervening change in the governing interpretation of the statute of 
conviction.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Figueroa v. 
Fernandez, No. 9:19-CV-0373-GLS, 2019 WL 1762584, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2019) (“Petitioner 
has provided no allegations or evidence of actual innocence; therefore, he has failed to establish that this 
exception applies.”); Aubin v. Beasley, No. 2:18-cv-00051-DPM/PSH, 2018 WL 5724450, at *5 (E.D. 
Ark. Oct. 12, 2018) (“Aubin is not imprisoned for an offense that is no longer a crime. . . . The savings 
clause does not apply to such a claim.”). 
The Ninth Circuit has expressly stated that they “have not yet resolved the question whether a 
petitioner may ever be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence for the purpose of qualifying for the 
escape hatch.” Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, some courts in the First 
Circuit have assumed, without deciding, that sentencing claims are cognizable under the savings clause. 
See, e.g., Williams v. Spaulding, No. 18-cv-11554-KAR, 2019 WL 2107275, at *4 (D. Mass. May 14, 
2019). The D.C. Circuit has yet to weigh in. 
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unequivocally closed this door to federal prisoners.70 The Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits have cracked the door open enough for prisoners to seek relief when they 
are serving a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum or “shares similarities 
with serving a sentence imposed above the statutory maximum.”71 And recently, 
the Fourth Circuit significantly opened the door to relief that is mostly consistent 
with the doctrinal test that this Article proposes.72 
Although each of these courts grappled with the savings clause language— 
some more exhaustively and intentionally than others—none fully recognized 
that the plain meaning of the savings clause allows relief for sentencing errors 
and that any other interpretation raises profound constitutional questions. 
A. THE DOOR IS CLOSED 
The Third,73 Fifth,74 Tenth,75 and Eleventh76 Circuits have had occasion to con-
sider whether a sentencing claim is cognizable under the savings clause. These 
courts, citing concerns of finality of judgments and judicial economy, have con-
cluded that prisoners cannot resort to relief under the savings clause.77 
In Gilbert v. United States, a case involving a collateral Begay claim,78 the 
Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed the question of whether “the savings 
70. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1079–80; Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102–03 
(3d Cir. 2017); Bradford v. Tamez, 660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Prost, 636 F.3d at 
584–86. 
71. See Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 599 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 
588 (7th Cir. 2013). 
72. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 419, 429 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that a federal 
prisoner may file a successive claim for relief under section 2241 following change in substantive law 
that is retroactively applicable on collateral review, when the sentence “presents an error sufficiently 
grave to be deemed a fundamental defect” (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2255(e), 2255(h)(2) (2012))). 
73. See Gardner, 845 F.3d at 103 (“[W]e [previously] recognized that § 2255’s savings clause 
provides a safety valve for actual innocence, but without short-circuiting § 2255’s gatekeeping 
requirements. Adopting Gardner’s approach—under which all sentencing issues based on new Supreme 
Court decisions could be raised via § 2241 petitions—would accomplish just that.” (citation omitted)). 
74. See Bradford, 660 F.3d at 230 (“[A]ctual innocence of a career offender enhancement is not a 
claim of actual innocence of the crime of conviction and, thus, not the type of claim that warrants review 
under § 2241.”). 
75. The Tenth Circuit, undoubtedly, has the most restrictive savings clause jurisprudence. See Prost, 
636 F.3d at 584–88 (concluding that actual innocence claims and sentencing claims are not cognizable 
under the savings clause). However, the Eleventh Circuit recently entered the race for that title. In 
McCarthan, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly relied on Prost’s reasoning to overturn its existing precedent 
that allowed actual innocence and sentencing claims to pass through the savings clause. See 851 F.3d at 
1080, 1095–1100 (“We join the Tenth Circuit in applying the law as Congress wrote it and hold that a 
change in caselaw does not make a motion to vacate a prisoner’s sentence ‘inadequate or ineffective to 
test the legality of his detention.’” (citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e))), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 502 (2017). 
76. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1080. 
77. See, e.g., Prost, 636 F.3d at 583 (discussing the finality principle). 
78. A Begay claim is one in which a petitioner claims an error in the application of the violent felony 
enhancement, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), which results in a higher statutory minimum and 
maximum sentence under section 924(e). See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008) (holding 
that driving under the influence, while posing a serious risk of injury to others, is not an ACCA predicate 
because the “conduct for which the drunk driver is convicted . . . need not be purposeful or deliberate”). 
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clause of § 2255(e) appl[ies] to claims that the sentencing guidelines were 
misapplied in the pre-Booker mandatory guidelines era in a way that resulted 
in a substantially longer sentence that does not exceed the statutory maxi-
mum.”79 Before the Supreme Court held in Booker that the sentencing guide-
lines were only advisory, not mandatory, district courts had no discretion to 
sentence a defendant outside of the guidelines range.80 The Eleventh Circuit 
determined that savings clause relief is unavailable to pre-Booker sentences, 
noting that the clause’s text “does not indicate that it authorizes the filing of 
a § 2241 petition to remedy a miscalculation of the sentencing guidelines that 
already has been, or may no longer be, raised in a § 2255 motion,”81 and cit-
ing the “finality-busting effects of permitting prisoners to use the savings 
clause as a means of evading the second or successive motions bar.”82 These 
policy interests prompted the court to “decline Gilbert’s invitation to under-
mine finality of judgment principles by using § 2255(e) to knock down the 
second or successive motions bar that Congress constructed in § 2255(h)” 
and conclude that sentencing claims cannot be brought under section 2241 
via section 2255(e).83 
Several vigorous dissents followed. The dissenters argued that not allowing 
relief from a sentencing error that resulted in an additional eight and one-half 
years of prison time for Gilbert was not only an extraordinary miscarriage of jus-
tice, but also violated the Suspension Clause.84 In particular, they argued that 
“where the application of the statutory bar in § 2255(h) would deny [] federal 
prisoner[s] such a meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate that they are being 
held pursuant to the erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law, “the 
savings clause must apply in order to avoid an unconstitutional suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus.”85 The dissenters contended that the majority adopted a 
“Catch-22” approach to sentencing claims by not allowing federal prisoners to 
seek relief under the habeas savings clause because those prisoners previously  
79. 640 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). For an excellent account discussing Gilbert’s journey 
through this case, see Alec Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal 
Justice Reform,” 128 YALE L.J. F. 848, 869–70 (2019). 
80. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
81. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1307. 
82. Id. at 1309. 
83. Id. at 1312; see also McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 
1079–80 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017). In McCarthan, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that claims challenging the legality of a sentence cannot be brought under the savings 
clause. See id. at 1085–90. The court reasoned that the savings clause is limited to claims challenging 
the “execution of [a] sentence, such as the deprivation of good-time credits or parole determinations.” 
Id. at 1092–93. A claim attacking the legality of a sentence can be brought only in two “limited 
circumstances”: first, if “the sentencing court is unavailable” (for example, because the sentencing court 
itself has been dissolved); or second, when some other “practical consideration[]” prevents the petitioner 
from filing a section 2255 motion. Id. at 1093. 
84. See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1329–30 & n.3 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
85. Id. at 1329–30 (footnote omitted). 
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filed a timely section 2255 motion that the court “erroneously rejected.”86 This 
“judicial ‘gotcha,’” tethered to the pursuit of finality, “cast a pall of unconstitu-
tionality over the otherwise beneficial provisions of § 2255.”87 The dissenters 
concluded by noting that many others are in Gilbert’s position—sitting in prison 
serving sentences that were illegally imposed: “We used to call such systems 
‘gulags.’ Now, apparently, we call them the United States.”88 
Similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision in Gilbert, the Third and 
Fifth Circuits, in cursory opinions, held that federal prisoners cannot pursue relief 
under the savings clause to challenge their statuses as career offenders or their 
mandatory minimum sentences. They reasoned that the savings clause is avail-
able only to prisoners asserting actual innocence claims—meaning that they were 
convicted of a nonexistent crime.89 In both cases, the court failed to engage in 
any meaningful interpretation of the text of the savings clause or provide any ra-
tionale as to why actual innocence claims are constitutionally different than sen-
tencing error claims. 
The Tenth Circuit in Prost v. Anderson addressed whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, the savings clause allows a federal prisoner to file a habeas petition 
under the general habeas corpus statute, section 2241.90 In an opinion authored by 
then-Judge Gorsuch (now Justice Gorsuch), Prost held that section 2255(e) only 
permits prisoners to challenge their convictions or sentences under the general 
habeas statute, section 2241, if the prisoner’s detention could not “have been 
tested in an initial § 2255 motion.”91 Meaning, “section 2241 [habeas relief] is 
available only when a prisoner literally could not get to court to file an initial sec-
tion 2255 motion, such as where ‘the defendant’s sentencing court had been abol-
ished’ when the prisoner sought to file the initial section 2255 motion.”92 
86. Id. at 1336 (Hill, J., dissenting). Chief Judge (then Circuit Judge) Roger L. Gregory of the Fourth 
Circuit better explained this “Catch-22” in United States v. Surratt: 
I suppose we just have fundamentally different views on the role of habeas corpus, as well as 
the role of the judiciary in granting the writ. I see it as our solemn responsibility to guard 
against a morbid encroachment upon that which is so precious our Framers ensured its con-
tinued vitality in our Constitution. Instead we guard the Great Writ itself, and so closely that 
Surratt must spend the rest of his life in prison—against the will of the government and the 
district court. Our abdication of this responsibility begs the question: quis custodiet ipsos 
custodies? Who will guard the guards themselves? 
It is within our power to do more than simply leave Surratt to the mercy of the executive 
branch. To hope for the right outcome in another’s hands perhaps is noble. But only when 
we actually do the right thing can we be just. 
797 F.3d 240, 276 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 
2015). 
87. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1336 (Hill, J., dissenting). 
88. Id. at 1337. 
89. See Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 2017); Bradford v. Tamez, 
660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
90. See 636 F.3d 578, 584 (10th Cir. 2011). 
91. Id. at 584, 588. 
92. Litman, supra note 6, at 72 (emphasis added) (quoting Prost, 636 F.3d at 588). 
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Judge Gorsuch provided several reasons to support his interpretation of section 
2255(e). First, the “remedy” described in the statute’s text is concerned with the 
process—not substance—of section 2255 proceedings, which only included the 
“opportunity to bring [an] argument,” rather than to “win” it.93 Second, Congress, 
when it enacted section 2255, “was surely aware that prisoners might seek to pur-
sue second or successive motions based on newly issued statutory interpretation 
decisions, but Congress did not allow those kinds of claims to be raised in succes-
sive motions.”94 Third, “several surrounding provisions emphasize ‘providing a 
single opportunity to test arguments, rather than any guarantee of relief or 
results.’”95 Finally, “section 2255 was enacted to allow federal prisoners to chal-
lenge their convictions and sentences in the district where they were sentenced, 
rather than only in the district where they were incarcerated.”96 Section 2255, 
according to Judge Gorsuch, “was not adopted to expand or impinge upon prison-
ers rights of collateral attack upon their convictions, but only to address the ‘diffi-
culties that had arisen in administering habeas corpus.’”97 
Significantly, Judge Gorsuch did not have to address any of these issues. As 
Judge Seymour recognized in a separate opinion, Prost should have been decided 
on a much narrower ground.98 Specifically, Prost had an “adequate and effective 
opportunity to test the legality of his conviction [in his first section 2255 motion] 
because he was not foreclosed by [any] precedent” to raise his actual innocent 
claim of money laundering.99 Because Prost failed to raise this issue, Prost’s ha-
beas petition could have been dismissed on that ground. Instead, Judge Gorsuch, 
who on many occasions excoriated the Tenth Circuit for not exercising judicial 
restraint,100 showed no restraint. In a sharp rebuke, Judge Seymour pointed out 
that Judge Gorsuch’s opinion interpreting the savings clause “creat[ed] an 
unnecessary circuit split on an issue that was neither raised by the parties nor 
implicated by the facts of this case.”101 Before Prost, all circuits that addressed 
claims of actual innocence agreed that, at a minimum, those claims were cogniza-
ble under the savings clause.102 But Judge Gorsuch would only allow claims 
when a prisoner could not have filed an initial section 2255 motion because the 
93. Prost, 636 F.3d at 584, 588. 
94. See Litman, supra note 6, at 72–73 (quoting Prost, 636 F.3d at 585). 
95. Id. at 73 (quoting Prost, 636 F.3d at 587). 
96. Id. (quoting Prost, 636 F.3d at 587–88). 
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prost, 636 F.3d at 587–88). 
98. See Prost, 636 F.3d at 598–99 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
99. Id. at 599. 
100. See, e.g., Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1208 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (cautioning courts to “avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of 
the necessity of deciding them” (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 
445 (1988))); id. (“Caution is always warranted when venturing down the road of deciding a weighty 
question of first impression . . . .”); Williams v. Jones, 583 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, 
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“It’s not every day we exacerbate a split of authority 
over the recognition of a new constitutional right . . . .”). 
101. Prost, 636 F.3d at 599 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
102. Id. at 604–05 (collecting cases). 
302 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 108:287 
sentencing court had been abolished.103 Judge Seymour would have interpreted 
the savings clause consistently with all other circuits at the time to allow actual 
innocence claims to pass through.104 
Crucially, as Professor Leah Litman correctly argues, Judge Gorsuch’s inter-
pretation of the savings clause would not allow any of the following federal pris-
oners to challenge their convictions or sentences under section 2241: “prisoners 
who were convicted of acts the law did not make criminal; prisoners who were 
sentenced above the statutory maximum for their offense; or prisoners whose 
convictions or sentences violated some substantive rule of constitutional law.”105 
In other words, not only does Justice Gorsuch believe that no sentencing claims 
are cognizable under the habeas savings clause, but he also believes that this 
clause provides no relief for federal prisoners who are actually innocent of the 
underlying offense. Troubling.106 Even more troubling is that the Eleventh 
Circuit reached the same conclusion relying principally on Justice Gorsuch’s rea-
soning in Prost.107 
In sum, none of these courts would allow a person to raise a sentencing claim, 
yet there is significant disagreement in these courts’ interpretations of the savings 
clause. For example, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits would allow relief only 
when the sentencing court had been abolished or when a prisoner had been 
deprived of good-time credits or parole determinations. The Third and Fifth 
Circuits would allow claims that a person is actually innocent of the underling 
offense, but not sentencing claims. The rationale behind all of these opinions 
appears to be that courts have to draw the line somewhere. Animated by finality, 
those courts decided to draw a line—a line unsupported by the text of the savings 
clause—that strips habeas of liberty and keeps people in chains. Perhaps, as 
Justice Brennan observed, these courts are just afraid “of too much justice.”108 
B. HOLD THE DOOR 
Whereas the door to habeas relief for sentencing errors has been closed in the 
Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have 
cracked the door open in a slight, yet significant way. These courts make it clear 
that some sentencing errors are cognizable under the savings clause. 
103. Id. at 588 (majority opinion). 
104. Id. at 603–06 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
105. Litman, supra note 6, at 72 (citing Prost, 636 F.3d at 588–94). 
106. Or, as Professor Litman, put it: “Ooph.” Id. 
107. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1092–93 (11th Cir. 
2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017). 
108. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Judge William Pryor 
articulated the same fear: “The law will forever be in a state of flux, and Congress in a state of 
legislation. A federal prisoner’s sentence cannot always be vulnerable to collateral attack, lest the 
finality of convictions ceases to exist.” Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 766 F.3d 1271, 1293 
(11th Cir. 2014) (Pryor, J., concurring). Judge Pryor subsequently authored the en banc majority in 
McCarthan, which held that neither actual innocence claims nor sentencing claims are cognizable under 
the savings clause. 851 F.3d at 1076. 
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In Brown v. Caraway, the sentencing court applied a career offender enhance-
ment, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, to Brown’s sentence for drugs and firearm possession in 
light of prior convictions of second-degree assault and third-degree arson in 
Delaware.109 Brown’s designation as a career offender resulted in an offense- 
guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment.110 Because Brown was 
sentenced pre-Booker, when guidelines ranges were mandatory, Brown was sen-
tenced to 360 months.111 Absent the career offender enhancement, Brown’s 
guidelines range would have been 262 to 327 months.112 Brown’s subsequent sec-
tion 2255 petition was unsuccessful.113 
Brown later filed a section 2241 petition challenging the enhancement because 
his prior offense for third-degree arson no longer constituted a crime of violence 
under Begay; thus, Brown should not have been sentenced under the career offender 
enhancement.114 The district court dismissed the petition.115 The Seventh Circuit 
reversed, holding that Brown’s petition had satisfied the court’s three-part test to fall 
within the savings clause exception and was, therefore, properly heard under section 
2241.116 First, Brown relied on a case of statutory interpretation, rather than a “con-
stitutional case,” which would have satisfied one of the conditions for a successive 
challenge under section 2255(h).117 Second, Brown relied on a case determined ret-
roactive by the Supreme Court that he could not have invoked in his original section 
2255 motion.118 Finally, the sentencing error Brown complained of was sufficiently 
grave to be “deemed a miscarriage of justice,” or, put another way, a “fundamental 
defect” in the criminal process capable of being corrected in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding.119 Specifically, because Brown was sentenced above his sentencing range, 
that error was a “fundamental defect.”120 
Importantly, in response to the argument that the savings clause requires “a 
claim of actual innocence directed to the underlying conviction, not merely the 
sentence,”121 the Seventh Circuit stood on the language of the savings clause, sec-
tion 2255(e).122 The court noted that the savings clause makes no reference to 
“convictions” but instead makes relief available where the “§ 2255 remedy is 
‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’”123 Under this 
109. 719 F.3d 583, 584–85 (7th Cir. 2013). 
110. Id. at 585. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 586. 
115. Id. 
116. See id. at 586–89. 
117. Id. at 586–87. 
118. Id. at 586. 
119. Id. (first quoting Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012); then quoting In re 
Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
120. Id. at 587–88. 
121. Id. at 586. 
122. Id. at 588. 
123. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012)). 
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interpretation, the court reasoned that if a prisoner was sentenced when the guide-
lines were mandatory by law, then “a § 2241 habeas petition raising a guidelines 
error ‘tests the legality of his detention.’”124 The Seventh Circuit thus found 
Brown entitled to relief under section 2241.125 
The Sixth Circuit addressed a similar issue in Hill v. Masters.126 Like the de-
fendant in Brown, Hill was sentenced as a career offender under the pre-Booker 
mandatory guidelines because he “had two prior felony convictions in Maryland— 
a controlled-substance offense and second-degree assault.”127 With the career of-
fender enhancement, “Hill was sentenced to 300 months of imprisonment based on 
a [mandatory] guideline range of 292 to 365 months.”128 Had he not been sen-
tenced as a career offender, Hill’s guideline range would have been 235 to 293 
months.129 More importantly, because Hill was sentenced as a career offender, he 
was not eligible for “subsequent retroactive amendments to the guidelines that 
[would have] place[d] his guidelines range as low as 188 to 235 months.”130 
Hill later filed a section 2241 petition challenging the enhancement because his 
prior Maryland conviction for second-degree assault no longer constituted a 
crime of violence under Descamps v. United States131 and the Fourth Circuit’s de-
cision in United States v. Royal;132 thus, under those decisions, Hill should not 
have been sentenced under the career offender enhancement.133 The Sixth Circuit 
agreed, adopting Brown’s interpretation of the savings clause—that sentencing 
claims are cognizable under the plain reading of section 2255.134 However, the 
court’s decision applied to a “narrow subset” of section 2241 petitions: 
(1) prisoners who were sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime pre- 
[Booker], (2) who are foreclosed from filing a successive petition under § 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 596. 
126. 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016). 
127. Id. at 593. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. 570 U.S. 254 (2013). In Descamps, the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession 
of a firearm. Id. at 258. Because Descamps had a prior conviction for burglary, the district court imposed 
a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA. Id. at 259. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that Descamps’s prior conviction for burglary under California law was not a 
violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA. Id. at 260. The elements of California burglary were 
broader and therefore encompassed more potential conduct than did those of the generic burglary 
offense. Id. at 274. Thus, the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the sentencing enhancement. Id. at 277–78. 
132. 731 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit applied Descamps to Maryland’s second- 
degree assault statute, one of Hill’s predicate felonies. Because Maryland’s second-degree assault 
statute defined assault more broadly than the generic crime, the Fourth Circuit concluded it was not a 
“violent felony” under the ACCA. Id. at 342. Specifically, “Maryland’s second-degree assault statute 
reaches any unlawful touching, whether violent or nonviolent and no matter how slight”; thus, 
“convictions under the statute . . . cannot categorically be crimes of violence.” Id. (quoting Karimi v. 
Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 568 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
133. See Hill, 836 F.3d at 593. 
134. Id. at 599–600. 
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2255, and (3) when a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation 
by the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a predicate 
offense for a career-offender enhancement.135 
The Sixth Circuit held that Hill satisfied its test because he “was sentenced 
under the mandatory guidelines,” was “barred from filing a successive § 2255 peti-
tion; and received the [unlawful career offender] enhancement based on a prior 
conviction that a subsequent, retroactive change in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
[Descamps] reveal[ed was] not a predicate offense.”136 The court concluded, “[t]o 
require that Hill serve an enhanced sentence as a career offender, bearing the 
stigma of a ‘repeat violent offender’ and all its accompanying disadvantages, is a 
miscarriage of justice where he lacks the predicate felonies to justify such a 
characterization.”137 
C. THE DOOR IS OPEN 
Recently, the Fourth Circuit pushed the door open to federal prisoners to raise 
sentencing errors that result in a fundamental defect in the criminal justice sys-
tem. In United States v. Wheeler, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether a prisoner 
can challenge his sentence under the savings clause when the sentence was 
enhanced by a court under a mistaken understanding of the Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”).138 That mistake resulted in a mandatory minimum sen-
tence for Wheeler that doubled what it should have been under the correct inter-
pretation of the CSA.139 The Fourth Circuit held that “[a]n increase in the 
congressionally mandated minimum sentencing floor” is “an error sufficiently 
grave to be deemed a ‘fundamental defect.’”140 Specifically, the court reasoned 
that “when [a federal prisoner] never should have been subject to an increase[d 
sentence] in the first place, the error is grave.”141 Why? “An increase in the con-
gressionally mandated sentencing floor implicates separation of powers princi-
ples and due process rights fundamental to our justice system.”142 Therefore, 
Wheeler was allowed to bring his claim under the habeas savings clause.143 
***** 
All of these cases turned on the courts’ interpretation of the statutory language 
found in the savings clause, section 2255(e), which this Article now addresses. 
135. Id. (citation omitted) 
136. Id. at 600. 
137. Id. 
138. 886 F.3d 415, 419–22 (4th Cir. 2018). 
139. See id. at 431. 
140. Id. at 430. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. It appears that the Fourth Circuit will continue to take a case-by-case approach to sentencing 
errors. See id. at 433 n.11 (“We make no decision regarding whether an erroneous sentence above the 
statutory maximum is a fundamental defect for purposes of the savings clause. . . .”). 
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III. THE SAVINGS CLAUSE TEXT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF 
In all cases of statutory construction, the starting point to any analysis is to 
examine the language of the statute for a “plain and unambiguous meaning 
with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”144 The inquiry typically ends 
here for courts if the statutory language is “unambiguous and the statutory 
scheme is coherent and consistent.”145 The answer to whether the savings 
clause allows for consideration of second or successive claims of at least some 
sentencing species is determined by close examination of the statutory lan-
guage. Paramount to this analysis is the Supreme Court’s command that habeas 
corpus is governed by “equitable principles,”146 including the “principles of 
fundamental fairness underl[ying] the writ.”147 
Turning to the statutory language, the savings clause of section 2255(e) allows 
a federal prisoner to seek a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 2241 when 
the “remedy” provided by section 2255 proves “inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of . . . detention.”148 So, what does this mean?149 
A. “REMEDY” 
Courts that have concluded that sentencing claims fall outside of the habeas 
savings clause contend that “remedy” refers to the process of challenging the pris-
oner’s conviction, not the outcome of that process.150 In other words, because sec-
tion 2255(e) is concerned with process, not substance, so long as a federal 
prisoner had the opportunity to bring an argument—never mind if Supreme Court 
or circuit precedent foreclosed that argument—the remedy in section 2255 is 
adequate and effective. 
This interpretation is not only unpersuasive but is also inconsistent with 
Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has made clear that the correct in-
quiry is whether the process afforded by section 2255 can fairly be described as 
providing “a meaningful opportunity” for relief—a nominal opportunity, as dis-
cussed in Part IV, is constitutionally insufficient.151 Moreover, the Court has 
144. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). 
145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 213 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
147. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 351 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
148. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000). 
149. For a great historical account of the Suspension Clause, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537 (2010). In his account, 
Professor Neuman states that the Supreme Court in “Boumediene and St. Cyr reiterated that what 
matters is the substance, not the form, of the Great Writ. Congress can rename or reconfigure the 
procedure by which courts examine the lawfulness of detention, so long as the new structure provides an 
‘adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus.’” Id. at 542 (footnote omitted). 
150. See, e.g., Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584–85 (10th Cir. 2011). 
151. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (emphasis added) (“We do consider it 
uncontroversial, however, that the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful 
opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ 
of relevant law.” (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001))). 
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stated that “a theoretically available procedural alternative . . . does not offer 
most defendants a meaningful opportunity.”152 
In addition, the Supreme Court has used “‘remedy’ to refer to the result a plain-
tiff obtained by filing suit, not just the process applicable to different kinds of 
lawsuits.”153 This makes sense. “[A]s a verb, ‘remedy’ means to set something 
right; as a noun, it can mean the fix for that something (e.g., the result).”154 
Litman, supra note 6, at 74 (footnote omitted); see also Remedy, LEXICO, https://www.lexico. 
com/en/definition/remedy [https://perma.cc/FMU3-S6FS] (last visited Oct. 10, 2019) (defining 
“remedy” as “a means of counteracting or eliminating something undesirable”). 
Importantly, Congress, in other statutes, often “uses relief to signify the result of 
a remedy; the two terms are not so distinct.”155 
Despite this clear guidance—from precedent, plain meaning, and interpretive 
canons—courts have denied relief when the effects of the criminal statute no lon-
ger authorize the federal prisoner’s detention. 
B. “LEGALITY OF DETENTION” 
Congress’s use of the terms “legality” and “detention” is highly significant to 
the scope of the savings clause. The word “detention” by definition includes chal-
lenges to a conviction, but it equally applies to challenges to a sentence.156 
Indeed, “detention” is commonly defined as “[k]eeping in custody.”157 And, as 
the Supreme Court has previously stated, detention certainly implies imprison-
ment.158 “Legality” means “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being allowed by 
law.”159 Thus, the plain language of this phrase appears to invite claims where the 
prisoner’s success on his claim could result in a reduced period of detention. 
Based on this understanding, the Wheeler, Brown, and Hill courts concluded that 
“detention” includes some sentencing claims.160 
152. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 427–28 (2013) (discussing procedural alternatives in the 
context of the opportunity to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
153. Litman, supra note 6, at 74 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 
U.S. 14, 20–21 (1980) (“Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more 
effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United States.”); N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (“The prohibition is absolute, and it would inescapably operate to 
obstruct the remedies granted by the District Court in the Swann case.”). 
154. 
155. Litman, supra note 67, at 488 (footnote omitted); see also 12 U.S.C. § 3755(b)(2) (2012) 
(“[O]ther remed[ies] . . . includ[e] . . . relief under an assignment of rents.”); 22 U.S.C. § 1631f(c) 
(2012) (“The sole relief and remedy . . . shall be that provided by . . . this section . . . .”); 22 U.S.C. § 
1631g(i) (2012) (similar); 22 U.S.C. § 1642b (2012) (“No judicial relief or remedy shall be 
available . . . .”). 
156. Detention, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “detention” to include “[t]he 
act or an instance of holding a person in custody”). 
157. See Detention, IV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 545 (J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner eds., 2d 
ed. 1989); see also Detention, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 616 (1966) (defining “detention” as “a holding in custody”). 
158. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment [is freedom] 
from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
159. Legality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). 
160. Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 598 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that “the savings clause makes no 
reference to ‘convictions’ and instead makes relief available when the ‘§ 2255 remedy is inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of his detention’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. 
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This interpretation finds support in section 2255’s structure. Other provisions 
of section 2255 expressly impose a conviction-only limitation, underscoring that 
no such implicit limitation was intended in section 2255(e).161 For example, in 
section 2255(h), Congress provided an avenue for a successive collateral attack 
based on newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish “that no reasonable 
factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense.”162 If Congress had 
intended to limit savings clause relief to claims challenging only the offense or 
conviction, rather than the sentence, it could have easily done so by simply using 
the word “conviction” or “offense” in section 2255(e)—just as it did in section 
2255(h)(1)—instead of “detention.”163 It did not, and “[i]t is accepted lore that 
when Congress uses certain words in one part of a statute, but omits them in 
another, an inquiring court should presume that this differential draftsmanship 
was deliberate.”164 For these reasons, this Article contends that there can be no 
dispute that “detention” includes being able to test the legality of a sentence.165 
C. “INADEQUATE OR INEFFECTIVE” 
The dispositive inquiry for courts that have denied habeas relief for sentencing 
errors is whether the prisoner had a mere opportunity to raise the sentencing claim 
at an earlier proceeding.166 Under those courts’ rationales, so long as the prisoner 
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 2013))); Brown, 719 F.3d at 588 (“The text of the clause focuses 
on the legality of the prisoner’s detention; [§ 2255(e)] does not limit its scope to testing the legality of 
the underlying criminal conviction.” (citation omitted)). 
161. See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 573 (2009) (“Where Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). Further, the doctrine of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius counsels against judicial recognition of such a significant limitation. See Reyes-Gaona 
v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, 250 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the expressio unius doctrine 
“instructs that where a law expressly describes a particular situation to which it shall apply, what was 
omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded”). 
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (establishing a 
period of limitation based on the date of conviction). 
163. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353 (2013) (“Congress’ choice of 
words is presumed to be deliberate . . . .”). 
164. United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2002). 
165. Some courts and scholars disagree with this Article on this point, arguing instead that detention 
should be defined as keeping someone in confinement. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries- 
Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1089 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); 
Jennifer L. Case, Text Me: A Text-Based Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), 103 KY. L.J. 169, 191 
(2014) (“‘Detention’ differs from a criminal ‘sentence.’”). This Article agrees with that definition. This 
Article disagrees, however, with the notion that someone serving an unlawful sentence does not fall in 
that category. Those courts and scholars would limit “detention” only to claims challenging good-time 
credits, parole revocation, or other prison disciplinary proceedings. 
166. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1085–86 (“Whether circuit precedent ‘was once adverse to a 
prisoner has nothing to do with whether his motion to vacate his sentence is inadequate or ineffective to 
test the legality of his detention.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Samak v. Warden, FCC 
Coleman-Medium, 766 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2014) (W. Prior, J., concurring))); id. at 1086 (“That 
is, he could have made the argument that his prior convictions did not qualify him for an enhanced 
sentence under the statute. ‘To test’ the legality of his detention and satisfy the saving clause, a prisoner 
is not required ‘to win’ his release.”); id. at 1087 (“Despite circuit precedent, McCarthan could have 
tested the legality of his detention by requesting that we reconsider our precedent en banc or by 
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had a formal chance to raise his claim in a section 2255 motion—even if there 
was existing Supreme Court or circuit court precedent that rendered that claim 
futile—the section 2255 proceeding is deemed adequate and effective.167 
According to these courts, the savings clause is limited to claims challenging the 
“execution of a sentence,” such as “the deprivation of good-time credits or parole 
determinations.”168 That means the Meaning, unless a prisoner can meet one of 
section 2255(h)’s two exceptions to the successive-motions bar, is that he can 
never file another collateral attack on his sentence or conviction.169 This, of course, 
reads the savings clause right out of the statute, even for claims based on new deci-
sions that make clear that a defendant was convicted of conduct that is not a 
crime.170 Stripping the savings clause of any independent meaning while simulta-
neously engrafting section 2255(h)’s requirements onto it is antithetical to the text, 
purpose, and structure of section 2255.171 Courts must endeavor to apply both stat-
utory provisions fully and prevent one from limiting the legal effect of the other. 
This can be done—this Article provides a sound statutory pathway forward.172 
Indeed, a federal prisoner should always “be permitted to seek habeas corpus 
only if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a 
fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after 
his first 2255 motion.”173 In other words, the relevant inquiry should be whether 
the prisoner, through no fault of his own, is seeking relief for a fundamental 
defect for which he has no source of redress under section 2255.174 It makes little 
sense to preclude habeas relief where the defendant had a theoretical opportunity 
to test the legality of his conviction or sentence by raising his claim at an earlier 
stage, even though that claim was foreclosed by either Supreme Court or circuit 
law throughout his sentence, direct appeal, and initial motion under section 2255. 
petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.”); see also Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584 
(10th Cir. 2011) (“The relevant metric or measure, we hold, is whether a petitioner’s argument 
challenging the legality of his detention could have been tested in an initial § 2255 motion.”); id. (“[T]he 
clause is concerned with process—ensuring the petitioner an opportunity to bring his argument—not 
with substance—guaranteeing nothing about what the opportunity promised will ultimately yield in 
terms of relief.”). 
167. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1086 (“That a court might reject a prisoner’s argument does not render 
his ‘remedy by motion’ an inadequate ‘means by which’ to challenge the legality of his sentence.”); id. 
at 1087 (“That a particular argument is doomed under circuit precedent says nothing about the nature of 
the motion to vacate.”). 
168. Id. at 1089, 1092–93. 
169. See id. at 1088 (“[A] motion to vacate could be ‘inadequate or ineffective to test’ a prisoner’s 
claim about the execution of his sentence because that claim is not cognizable under section 2255(a).”). 
170. See, e.g., In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[U]nder Bailey, mere possession 
of firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense does not constitute ‘use’ within the 
meaning of § 924(c)(1); thus, Jones is incarcerated for conduct that is not criminal.” (footnote omitted)). 
171. It is also antithetical to traditional canons of statutory interpretation. Implied repeals of 
jurisdictional statutes, for example, are disfavored. See, e.g., Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 643 (2002). This is especially true where, as here, the implied repeal raises 
constitutional concerns. 
172. See infra Section III.D & Part IV. 
173. In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998). 
174. Jones, 226 F.3d at 333 n.3. 
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In practice, where erroneous circuit precedent was in effect at the time of the 
initial section 2255 motion, it is virtually impossible to meaningfully raise a sen-
tencing or actual innocence claim. Specifically, it is entirely conceivable that ev-
ery single court to consider the prisoner’s case—the district court, the court of 
appeals panel, the en banc panel, and the Supreme Court—could conclude that 
the prisoner’s detention is unlawful, and yet also deny relief. For example, as 
argued in a recent petition for certiorari filed in Lewis v. English:  
� The district judge and appellate panel could conclude that his sentence was 
incorrect but that they were bound by the existing circuit precedent;  
� All of the court of appeals judges voting on the petition for rehearing en banc 
might conclude that the sentence was illegal, but that en banc review was not 
“necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions” and not 
warranted because the case did not “involve[] a question of exceptional im-
portance”; and  
� [The Supreme Court] could conclude that his sentence is unlawful, but that 
certiorari is unwarranted because there is no “conflict with the decision of 
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter” and the 
decision below did not “so far depart[] from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory 
power.”175 
Because every single court and jurist in that chain “could conclude that the 
prisoner’s detention is unlawful—and yet the prisoner could still be properly 
denied relief—necessarily means that in that circumstance, Section 2255 is ‘inad-
equate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’”176 
Stated more succinctly, a defendant cannot readily test his claim when that 
claim is foreclosed by controlling circuit law.177 The district and circuit courts are 
bound by precedent; only rare and discretionary action by the en banc court or the 
Supreme Court can change the law.178 And when a law-changing decision comes 
175. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18–19, Lewis v. English, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (mem.) (No. 
18-292), 2018 WL 4298032, at *18–19 (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) and SUP. CT. R. 
10(a) (providing rules for when hearing or rehearing en banc can be ordered and for consideration of 
certiorari)). 
176. Id. at *19 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012)). 
177. See MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 278 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A]s a panel, we 
cannot overrule a prior panel and are bound to apply principles decided by prior decisions of the court to 
the questions we address.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting R.R. ex rel. R. v. Fairfax Cty. 
Sch. Bd., 338 F.3d 325, 332 n.6 (4th Cir. 2003))). 
178. See Adams v. Zarnel, 619 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (“This panel is ‘bound by the decisions 
of prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by the 
Supreme Court.’” (quoting United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004))); United 
States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Under the prior precedent 
rule, we are bound to follow a prior binding precedent ‘unless and until it is overruled by this court en 
banc or by the Supreme Court.’” (quoting United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 
2003))). 
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after the usual avenues of relief—after direct appeal and initial adjudication of a 
section 2255 motion—are exhausted, a prisoner had no reasonable opportunity to 
rely on it at an earlier time. 
Importantly, Supreme Court precedent supports this interpretation. The 
Supreme Court has been clear that decisions “narrow[ing] the scope of a criminal 
statute by interpreting its terms” are given retroactive effect because such deci-
sions “necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an 
act that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot 
impose upon him.”179 When the Supreme Court or a circuit court interprets a stat-
ute and applies its ruling retroactively, but a prisoner is barred from relying on 
that interpretation merely because the Supreme Court or circuit court decided the 
case after his first section 2255 proceeding was done, section 2255 has certainly 
“proved inadequate or ineffective” within the meaning of the savings clause.180 
We need only look to the definitions of “inadequate” and “ineffective” and 
how those terms of art are used in our constitutional system to confirm this 
interpretation. 
The term “inadequate” is a term of art that appears in our equity jurisprudence, 
which finds in habeas corpus “a comfortable home.”181 And courts have routinely 
held that a remedy at law is “inadequate” if it is not “as complete, practical and 
efficient as that which equity could afford.”182 By definition, then, section 2255 
proves inadequate if that process “does not sufficiently correct the wrong.”183 
The term “ineffective,”184 as noted by Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum in her dis-
sent in McCarthan, “is a term of art in Sixth Amendment claims,”185 and is a 
common subject of habeas jurisprudence. In this context, as the Supreme Court 
has held, ineffective means “constitutionally deficient,” as in ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.186 Thus, when federal prisoners file second or successive 
motions asserting that a retroactively applicable new rule of statutory law means 
179. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)). 
180. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 776 (2008). 
181. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 647 (2010); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780 (“Habeas 
‘is, at its core, an equitable remedy.’” (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995))). 
182. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923). 
183. Inadequate Remedy at Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also McCarthan v. 
Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1105 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Jordan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining “inadequate” as “lacking in effectiveness” (emphasis 
omitted)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017). 
184. Ineffective, 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 239 (1st ed. 1933) (stating that “ineffective” means 
“[o]f such a nature as not to produce . . . the intended [] effect”). 
185. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1132 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). 
186. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 682, 687 (1984); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 
71–72 (1932). In Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for deciding ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. 466 U.S. at 687. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient.” Id. To prove deficiency, a defendant “must show that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88. “Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance” resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 
687. 
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that their sentences implicate certain constitutional principles—such as separa-
tion of powers and due process—section 2255’s remedy, or procedures, are “inef-
fective to test” the legality of their detentions.187 
D. THE RIGHT RESULT 
Congress’s words and intent are clear: a federal prisoner is permitted to seek 
habeas corpus relief via the savings clause if the prisoner had no reasonable op-
portunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a “fundamental defect” in the 
prisoner’s conviction or sentence because the law changed after the first section 
2255 motion.188 Distilled to its essence, the habeas savings clause has two proce-
dural components—first, the federal prisoner was foreclosed from bringing his 
claim at an earlier proceeding (for example, direct appeal or first section 2255 
motion) by precedent, and second, there has been an intervening decision of statu-
tory interpretation that is determined to be retroactive. Certainly, these are signifi-
cant hurdles that will bar many from habeas relief. There is also a substantive 
component: whether the claim raises a fundamental defect in the criminal pro-
ceedings, either in the conviction or the sentence. Because of these components, 
this Article proposes that courts adopt the following doctrinal test to determine 
the legality of detention: section 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the le-
gality of a sentence when the claim (1) relies on a retroactively applicable deci-
sion of statutory interpretation; (2) was foreclosed by binding precedent at the 
time of the initial section 2255 motion; and (3) involves a “fundamental defect” 
in the sentence. The issue becomes what types of sentencing errors constitute a 
fundamental defect, to which this Article now turns. 
IV. FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT: THE CEILING AND THE FLOOR 
Admittedly, the more difficult question (than the question of whether section 
2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence) is what types 
of sentencing errors constitute fundamental defects. There is little precedent that 
addresses this issue, and what precedent there is lacks much analysis—the think-
ing must be that you know it when you see it. There is, however, common sense. 
And, as we know, “the most fundamental guide to statutory construction [is] 
common sense,”189 and statutes should be constructed to avoid constitutional  
187. See infra Part IV. 
188. If, for example, a federal prisoner could have brought the claim—and did not—then courts 
would likely determine that section 2255 was adequate and effective. In other words, if a federal 
prisoner had an “unobstructed procedural shot” at filing a section 2255 motion, meaning there was not 
existing precedent foreclosing the claim on her direct appeal or initial section 2255 motion, then section 
2255 would likely prove adequate and effective. See, e.g., Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (listing circuits that have held that prisoners must have “unobstructed procedural shot[s]” at 
presenting their claims). 
189. First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 869 (4th Cir. 1989); see also 
United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 701 (10th Cir. 2011) (applying a “commonsense” interpretation of 
release conditions over an interpretation that is “overly technical”). 
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questions190 and absurd results.191 With these principles in mind, this Article 
argues that any error that alters the statutory range Congress prescribed for 
punishment—the ceiling or the floor—raises separation of powers and due process 
concerns. In these instances, a federal prisoner should have the ability to seek 
relief under the habeas savings clause, assuming the procedural requirements dis-
cussed above are met. If the prisoner lacks this ability, the savings clause is ren-
dered meaningless in violation, arguably, of the Suspension Clause of the United 
States Constitution.192 Habeas review, after all, is inextricably intertwined with 
both the separation of powers doctrine and the Due Process Clause.193 
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERN 
Pursuant to the design of our constitutional system, “defining crimes and fixing 
penalties are legislative, not judicial, functions.”194 “Congress has the power to 
define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion,” 
or to provide for individualized sentencing.195 In other words, Congress alone can 
set the maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment,196 and together they 
define legal boundaries for the punishment of a particular crime.197 Consistent 
with the constitutional principle of separation of powers, a defendant has a “con-
stitutional right to be deprived of liberty as punishment for criminal conduct only 
to the extent authorized by Congress,” and a violation of that principle “trenches  
190. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (“The canon of constitutional avoidance 
comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be 
susceptible of more than one construction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing between 
them.”). 
191. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (“It is true that 
interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative 
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 
667 (1897) (“[N]othing is better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as 
will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion 
. . . .”). 
192. See infra Section IV.C (discussing the Suspension Clause). 
193. The Constitution, through its separation of powers, secures individual liberty from unlawful or 
arbitrary restraint. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (“Security subsists, too, in 
fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful 
restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these 
principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.”); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554–55 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The very core of liberty secured by our 
Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of 
the Executive.”); Immigration & Naturalization Sys. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At its 
historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive 
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” (footnote omitted)). 
194. United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948) (footnote omitted). 
195. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991) (citing Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 
(1916)). 
196. See Evans, 333 U.S. at 486 (observing that “fixing penalties” is a “legislative, not judicial, 
function[]”). 
197. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (“A sentencing judge, however, is 
not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to 
determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined.”). 
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particularly harshly on individual liberty.”198 
A statutory construction error that results in a sentence that exceeds the statu-
tory maximum provided by Congress unquestionably implicates that separation 
of powers principle.199 In these circumstances, the court—not Congress— 
exercises the legislative power to set sentencing ranges. Because this raises seri-
ous, constitutional, separation of powers concerns, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits 
concluded that the imposition of a sentence above the otherwise applicable statu-
tory maximum, where circuit law squarely foreclosed the petitioner from raising 
the claim at trial or during an initial section 2255 motion, constitutes a fundamen-
tal error that is cognizable under the savings clause and section 2241.200 
Similarly, the imposition of an erroneous mandatory minimum sentence impli-
cates this separation of powers principle. The separation of powers concerns 
raised by a judicial alteration of the statutory sentencing range are identical 
whether the error affects the maximum or minimum term. Congress in each 
instance has plenary authority to set the boundaries of punishment, and courts 
have no authority to alter them.201 
Moreover, drawing a distinction between statutory mandatory-minimum and 
mandatory-maximum sentences is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
“[T]he floor of a mandatory range is as relevant to wrongdoers as the ceiling.”202 
In fact, mandatory minimum errors can have a far more severe impact: “A man-
datory minimum can . . . ‘mandate a minimum sentence of imprisonment more 
than twice as severe as the maximum the trial judge would otherwise have 
imposed,’” and can “eliminate a sentencing judge’s discretion in its entirety.”203 
Thus, an “erroneously-imposed,” recidivism-based “sentencing floor is problem-
atic on its own” because “it create[s] the mistaken impression that the district 
court ha[s] no discretion to vary downward from the low end of [the defendant’s 
guidelines] range.”204 
Put simply, “the separation of powers prohibits a court from imposing criminal 
punishment beyond what Congress meant to enact,”205 and “the Constitution 
198. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689–90 (1980). 
199. See Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2016); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (recognizing that a defendant may file a habeas petition because “sentences imposed pursuant to 
erroneous interpretations of the mandatory guidelines bear upon the legality of [a defendant’s] detention 
for purposes of the savings clause”); see also United States v. Newbold, 791 F.3d 455, 460 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(recognizing, in the context of an initial section 2255 motion, that such a sentence raises “separation-of- 
powers concerns” because the defendant “received a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him” 
(first citing Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1283 (11th Cir. 2013); and then quoting United States v. 
Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
200. See Hill, 836 F.3d at 598–600 (recognizing a section 2241 habeas petition within meaning of 
savings clause where the sentence is above statutory maximum); Brown, 719 F.3d at 588 (same). 
201. See Evans, 333 U.S. at 486 (“Congress has exhibited clearly the purpose to proscribe conduct 
within its power to make criminal and has not altogether omitted [a] provision for penalty.”). 
202. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 113 (2013). 
203. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244–45 (1998) (quoting McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
204. Newbold, 791 F.3d at 460 n.6 (emphasis added). 
205. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016). 
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requires substantive rules to have retroactive effect regardless of when a convic-
tion became final.”206 Federal prisoners must be able to vindicate this separation 
of powers principle. Without the ability to do so, section 2255’s constitutionality 
is doubtful. The savings clause—under this Article’s interpretation—avoids this 
problem.207 
In fact, that is the point of the savings clause—to “serve[] as a failsafe mecha-
nism to protect § 2255 from unconstitutionality by providing a substitute remedy 
for habeas corpus relief that § 2255 otherwise precludes but the Suspension 
Clause may require,”208 as the Supreme Court has recently reminded us.209 And 
because the Suspension Clause is designed to protect habeas corpus,210 “the 
Suspension Clause demands, at a minimum, the availability of habeas corpus 
relief to redress federal detention when it violates the very doctrinal underpin-
nings of habeas review.”211 Habeas review, as the Supreme Court has told us in 
Boumediene,212 finds its doctrinal underpinnings in the separation of powers 
principle.213 Scholars and courts214 have consistently emphasized the central im-
portance of this aspect of the opinion.215 Therefore, because habeas corpus is inti-
mately intertwined with the separation of powers principle and individual rights, 
206. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016). 
207. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 776 (2008) (describing statutes containing savings 
clauses that provide habeas corpus protections). 
208. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1122 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017). 
209. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776 (“The [Supreme] Court placed explicit reliance upon [the 
savings clause] provisions in upholding [28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the District of Columbia equivalent of 
section 2255] against constitutional challenges.” (first citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 
(1977); and then citing United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952))). 
210. As Professor Amanda Tyler has explained, “the Court has often premised its analysis of 
constitutional habeas claims on the idea that ‘at the absolute minimum, the [Suspension] Clause protects 
the writ as it existed when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.’” Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus 
and the American Revolution, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 635, 638 (2015) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746). 
211. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1122 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). 
212. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797 (“Chief among [freedom’s first principles] are freedom from 
arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of 
powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief 
derives.”). 
213. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1998) (characterizing separation of powers 
concerns as “the doctrinal underpinnings of habeas review”); see also Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
1257, 1268 (2016) (“Bousley noted that the separation of powers prohibits a court from imposing 
criminal punishment beyond what Congress meant to enact.” (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620–21)). 
214. See, e.g., Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1115 n.19 (9th Cir. 
2019) (“[T]he writ is an indispensable separation of powers mechanism.”). 
215. See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of 
Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 466 (2010) (describing Boumediene as “rooted in separation of powers 
and a concern about executive manipulation of legal rules”); Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of 
Guanta´namo Bay, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 1, 18 (2009) (describing Boumediene as “among the Court’s 
most important modern statements on the separation of powers”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s 
Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2111 
(2009) (observing that Boumediene supports a view of habeas corpus that is “as much about preserving 
the role of the courts as it is about protecting the individual rights of the litigants”). 
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detention that violates either principle necessarily tramples upon the doctrinal 
foundations of habeas review.216 
Significantly, when a prisoner is detained in violation of the separation of 
powers principle, “the violation does not somehow become less significant sim-
ply because the Supreme Court [or controlling circuit] does not recognize the vio-
lation by issuance of a new retroactively applicable rule of law until after the 
prisoner’s initial § 2255 claim has been resolved.”217 Indeed, section 2255(h)(2) 
allows second or successive claims based on a new retroactively applicable rule 
of constitutional law.218 Because “§ 2255 does not authorize second or successive 
claims based on a retroactively applicable new rule of statutory law,” the savings 
clause must allow prisoners a meaningful opportunity to raise these unlawful sen-
tencing claims “to save § 2255 from unconstitutionality.”219 
B. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS 
1. Stripping the Court of Its Sentencing Discretion 
There are also fundamental due process concerns raised where a district court 
imposes a sentence at “statutory gunpoint.”220 This occurs when a district court is 
stripped of its sentencing discretion because of an incorrect understanding of the 
reach of a criminal statute. 
In Hicks v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court found a due process violation 
because a defendant was erroneously sentenced to a mandatory forty-year term as 
a recidivist, thus depriving him of a state law entitlement to have a jury fix his 
sentence to any term “not less than ten . . . years.”221 The Court held that a defend-
ant always has a “substantial and legitimate expectation” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to “be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the 
[trier of fact] in the exercise of its statutory discretion.”222 Importantly, the Court 
rejected the state appellate court’s decision to affirm simply because the 
216. See, e.g., Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268 (“[T]he separation of powers prohibits a court from 
imposing criminal punishment beyond what Congress meant to enact.”); Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620–21 
(“For under our federal system it is only Congress, and not the courts, which can make conduct criminal. 
Accordingly, it would be inconsistent with the doctrinal underpinnings of habeas review to preclude 
petitioner from relying on our decision in Bailey in support of his claim that his guilty plea was 
constitutionally invalid.” (citations omitted)). 
217. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1122–23 (11th Cir. 
2017) (en banc) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); id. 
(“And the very same concepts that, under the Suspension Clause, demand the retroactivity of new rules 
of constitutional or statutory law on initial collateral review—the separation-of-powers doctrine and the 
principle of limited government powers—apply with equal force in the context of second or successive 
claims for collateral review based on a previously unavailable retroactively applicable rule of 
constitutional or statutory law.”). 
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2012) (providing that a second or successive motion can be filed 
when there is a previously unavailable “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court”). 
219. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1123 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). 
220. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 273 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g 
granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015). 
221. 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 51(A)(1) (1971)). 
222. Id. 
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erroneously imposed mandatory sentence was within the authorized range of 
punishment.223 
Hicks has been found to apply with equal force to sentences imposed by 
judges.224 The due process violation in Hicks was not deprivation of the defend-
ant’s right to a jury, but deprivation of his right to have the trier of fact “exercise 
. . . its statutory discretion” to impose a just sentence in light of the defendant’s 
individual characteristics.225 The same due process interests stated in Hicks are 
implicated by the deprivation of all judicial discretion to impose a lower sentence 
based on an erroneous interpretation of the sentencing statute. And the Supreme 
Court has not limited Hicks to juries simply by describing its holding in light of 
its facts. That Hicks arose on direct appeal does not imply that its assessment of 
the constitutional harm to the defendant is limited to that context.226 
In United States v. Tucker, the Supreme Court considered whether to vacate a 
sentence of twenty-five years of imprisonment for armed bank robbery that was 
enhanced by two prior constitutionally invalid convictions.227 The Court affirmed 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing 
because “there was a reasonable probability that the defective prior convictions 
may have led the trial court to impose a heavier prison sentence than it otherwise 
would have imposed.”228 The Court explained, “we deal here, not with a sentence 
imposed in the informed discretion of a trial judge, but with a sentence founded at 
least in part upon misinformation of constitutional magnitude.”229 It reasoned that 
“this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal 
record which were materially untrue.”230 The Court thus concluded that when a 
court fails to sentence a defendant within its informed discretion, that defendant’s 
due process rights have been violated.231 
The liberty interests recognized in Hicks and Tucker are equally implicated by 
the total deprivation of discretionary judicial sentencing. This occurs when a dis-
trict court sentences a person to an enhanced sentence under an erroneous 
223. Id. at 345–47. 
224. See Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 112 (3d Cir. 1997) (“We think that a judicial error of 
that kind [a judge erroneously sentencing a defendant to a mandatory term of imprisonment] would 
violate a defendant’s due process protections and we see no reason why a different result would be 
reached merely because the jury imposes the sentence.”); Chitwood v. Dowd, 889 F.2d 781, 786 (8th 
Cir. 1989) (“When the trial court exercises its [sentencing] discretion under the statute, a defendant has a 
legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the court. 
That expectation is a liberty interest, protected by due process and enforceable by way of habeas 
corpus.”); Prater v. Maggio, 686 F.2d 346, 350 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (“In Hicks, the jury both decided 
innocence or guilt and imposed sentence on the defendant. The rule of the case is not, however, limited 
to imposition of sentences by juries. In this case, the judge—not the jury—was vested with statutory 
discretion in sentencing.”). 
225. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346. 
226. See, e.g., Chitwood, 889 F.2d at 786. 
227. 404 U.S. 443, 444–46 (1972). 
228. Id. at 445–46 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
229. Id. at 447. 
230. Id. (quoting Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948)). 
231. Id. 
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interpretation of the applicable statute set forth by the controlling circuit court or 
the Supreme Court. That person was not sentenced under the correct sentencing 
range, thus violating due process. 
2. Lack of Access to Courts to Challenge the Legality of the Sentence 
There is another due process concern at issue here—that persons should have 
access to courts to test whether their detention is lawful.232 This principle is fun-
damental to our constitutional system. Two observations illustrate this point. 
First, the Framers of our Constitution were determined to constitutionalize pro-
tections against arbitrary detention. It is not an overstatement to suggest that the 
Framers were obsessed with creating safeguards that require the “Executive [to] 
answer to an impartial body with a valid cause for depriving one of his or her lib-
erty.”233 They did precisely this by constitutionalizing due process of law in the 
Fifth Amendment and habeas corpus through the Suspension Clause.234 This is 
important because the writ of habeas corpus—at its core—first “insure[s] the in-
tegrity of the process resulting in imprisonment”235 and second, as the Supreme 
Court has held, “afford[s] a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal 
restraint upon personal liberty.”236 Second, the right to due process and the writ 
of habeas corpus are “coextensive.”237 This means “‘due process [wa]s concerned 
with how and why a man was imprisoned; the writ was a procedural avenue by 
which a prisoner could get those questions before a court’ and be granted a rem-
edy for any due process violations.”238 A brief historical account is necessary for 
context and confirmation. 
Scholars and courts have written extensively on the relationship between the 
Due Process Clause and the writ of habeas corpus in American law.239 Most of 
232. This interest is particularly compelling when a person is serving a sentence that, after a 
corrected understanding of the applicable statute that resulted in the enhanced sentence, is above the 
sentencing guidelines range. 
233. Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 384 (2006) 
(footnote omitted); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (“[T]he origin of [due 
process] was an attempt by those who wrote Magna Carta to do away with the so-called trials of that 
period where people were liable to sudden arrest and summary conviction in courts and by judicial 
commissions with no sure and definite procedural protections and under laws that might have been 
improvised to try their particular cases.”). 
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended . . . .”). 
235. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 3 (1980); see also Ex 
parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (“The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, 
known to the common law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned 
without sufficient cause.”). 
236. Price v. Johntson, 334 U.S. 266, 283 (1948). 
237. Tyler, supra note 233, at 383. 
238. Id. at 382 (footnote omitted); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554–55 (2004) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has 
been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive.”). 
239. See, e.g., DUKER, supra note 235, at 126; Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 47 (2012); Redish & McNamara, supra note 44; David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, 
Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 61–65 (2006). 
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these works discuss the origins of due process of law. The phrase—due process 
of law—derives from the Magna Carta, which declares that “[n]o free man shall 
be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled, or in any way ruined, 
nor will [the king] go or send against him, [or commit him to prison], except by 
the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”240 This contribution 
has been said to be “worth more to mankind than all the Greek and Roman clas-
sics.”241 The immediate question became what remedy, if any, is available to a 
person that is committed to prison without due process of law. The answer is that 
person “may have an habeas corpus”—the historical vehicle used to vindicate a 
prisoner’s due process right.242 Thus, the very purpose of liberty is to be free from 
indefinite imprisonment. 
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, stated this principle clearly: 
To make imprisonment lawful, it must either be by process from the courts of 
judicature, or by warrant from some legal officer having authority to commit 
to prison; which warrant must be in writing . . . and express the causes of the 
commitment in order to be examined into (if necessary) upon a habeas corpus. 
If there be no cause expressed, the gaoler is not bound to detain the prisoner.243 
The Founders understood the importance of Blackstone’s words. Alexander 
Hamilton quoted from this very passage in The Federalist Papers.244 Moreover, 
in the debates leading up to ratification of the Constitution, many prominent offi-
cials argued that the “privilege [of the writ] . . . is essential to freedom.”245 Justice 
Antonin Scalia succinctly summarized Blackstone’s influence on our constitu-
tional structure: “The two ideas central to Blackstone’s understanding—due 
process as the right secured, and habeas corpus as the instrument by which 
due process could be insisted upon by a citizen illegally imprisoned—found  
240. Magna Carta ch. 39, reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 461 (2d ed. 1992) (emphasis 
added); see also Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076, 1079 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The 
constitutional due process guarantee traces its roots to the Magna Carta . . . .”); Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 521–24 (1884) (equating Magna Carta’s reference to “the law of the land” with “the due 
course and process of the law”). 
241. Isaac Franklin Russell, Due Process of Law, 14 YALE L.J. 322, 325–26 (1905). 
242. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (photo. 
reprt. 1982) (London, W. Rawlins 6th ed. 1681). 
243. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136 (footnote omitted). 
244. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro, John Dunn, Donald L. 
Horowitz & Eileen Hunt Botting eds., 2001). Hamilton contended that “the establishment of the writ of 
habeas corpus” would protect against “the practice of arbitrary imprisonments . . . in all ages, the 
favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny.” Id. 
245. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION: AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 108–09 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891) (statement of Judge Increase Sumner); see also WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 117 (Philadelphia, 2d ed. 1829) (“It is the great 
remedy of the citizen or subject against arbitrary or illegal imprisonment; it is the mode by which the 
judicial power speedily and effectually protects the personal liberty of every individual, and repels the 
injustice of unconstitutional laws or despotic governors.”). 
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expression in the Constitution’s Due Process and Suspension Clauses.”246 
One of the leading experts in habeas law, Professor Amanda Tyler, has—in 
many works—discussed this constitutional marriage between the due process 
clause and the writ of habeas corpus.247 She persuasively argues that: 
This marriage of constitutional protections follows because “[t]o hold some-
one in detention without affording her a judicial forum to test whether the 
detention is lawful . . . is the very essence of a deprivation of liberty without 
due process.” Although due process has come to mean many things over time, 
at its most fundamental and as it relates to the Great Writ, the guarantee of due 
process promises that the Executive must answer to an impartial body with a 
valid cause for depriving one of his or her liberty. Indeed, that the habeas rem-
edy is so crucial to the realization of this due process guarantee suggests that 
“had there been no Suspension Clause, such a remedy would still be implicitly 
mandated by the Constitution.” This conclusion follows, moreover, because 
the Suspension Clause should be read “as an integrated component of a 
broader constitutional scheme of rights to judicial review and judicial 
remedies.”248 
Professor Tyler is right. Federal prisoners always have—absent a valid suspen-
sion of the writ of habeas corpus by Congress—the due process right to ask a 
court to determine whether their detentions are lawful.249 And, when a person is 
serving an unlawful sentence, due process requires that the principle of finality 
must yield to the imperative of courts correcting fundamentally unjust sentences. 
Any other interpretation cuts at the heart of our constitutional structure. 
Indeed, another aspect of our constitutional structure that is implicated is the 
Suspension Clause, which ensures that the writ of habeas corpus—that is so 
deeply rooted in the separation of powers principle and due process—cannot be 
suspended. 
C. SUSPENSION OF THE GREAT WRIT 
The Suspension Clause of the Constitution provides: “The Privilege of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion 
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”250 This provision “secure[s] the 
writ [of habeas corpus] and ensure[s] its place in our legal system.”251 Because 
the Suspension Clause protects the writ of habeas corpus under the Constitution, 
246. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 555–56 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
247. See Amanda L. Tyler, A “Second Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus Act and the 
Statutory Origins of the Habeas Privilege, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1949 (2016); Amanda L. Tyler, The 
Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2012); Tyler, supra note 
210. 
248. Tyler, supra note 233, at 383–84 (footnotes omitted). 
249. See id. at 384 (“Accordingly, in the absence of a valid suspension, an American citizen detained 
on American soil (our paradigmatic habeas petitioner) enjoys at a minimum the due process right to ask 
a court to inquire into the cause for his or her detention.” (footnote omitted)). 
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
251. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008). 
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the Supreme Court has stated that the savings clause—to the extent that the rest 
of section 2255 does not provide for such review—ensures access to the writ of 
habeas corpus commensurate with what the Suspension Clause constitutionally 
may require.252 
In fact, failure to interpret the savings clause in this way would, as the 
Supreme Court has warned, raise “serious question[s] about the constitutionality 
of [section 2255].”253 Why? Because through its jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court has treated the savings clause as a constitutional failsafe for section 
2255.254 In other words, the Suspension Clause protects second and successive 
claims that section 2255(h) fails to permit. It does this through the savings 
clause.255 If the savings clause did not protect these claims—both actual inno-
cence and unlawful sentencing claims—section 2255 would likely violate the 
Suspension Clause.256 
This conclusion does not appear to be in dispute. In Boumediene, a fairly recent 
landmark decision that comprehensively interpreted the Suspension Clause, the 
Supreme Court held that the Suspension Clause is violated when a prisoner is 
denied “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to 
‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.”257 Where, as here, 
the application of the statutory bar in section 2255(h) would deny a federal pris-
oner such a meaningful opportunity to show that he was sentenced under an erro-
neous application of statutory law—thus raising both separation of powers and 
due process concerns—the savings clause must apply to avoid an unconstitutional 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. There must be an adequate substitute 
procedure for habeas corpus—itself an indispensable separation of powers and  
252. See id. at 776 (“The [Supreme] Court placed explicit reliance upon [the savings clause] 
provisions in upholding [28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the District of Columbia equivalent of § 2255] against 
constitutional challenges.” (first citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); and then citing 
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952))). 
253. Id. at 776 (quoting Swain, 430 U.S. at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
254. See, e.g., Hayman, 342 U.S. at 223 (“In a case where the Section 2255 procedure is shown to be 
‘inadequate or ineffective,’ the Section provides that the habeas corpus remedy [in § 2241] shall remain 
open to afford the necessary hearing.” (footnote omitted)). 
255. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776. Because courts “would be required to answer the difficult 
question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in and of itself a reason to avoid answering the 
constitutional questions that would be raised by concluding that review was barred entirely.” 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.13 (2001); see also Gerald L. 
Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 980 
(1998) (noting that “reconstructing habeas corpus law [for purposes of a Suspension Clause analysis] 
would be a difficult enterprise, given fragmentary documentation, state-by-state disuniformity, and 
uncertainty about how state practices should be transferred to new national institutions”). 
256. Section 2255(e) is referred to as the “savings” clause for a reason. “By permitting a federal 
prisoner to bring a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where § 2255 proves [an] ‘inadequate 
or ineffective remedy to test the legality of his detention,’ § 2255(e) operates to ‘save’ § 2255 from 
violating the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution.” Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 
1293, 1329 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
257. 553 U.S. at 779 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302). 
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due process mechanism—to be in compliance with the Suspension Clause.258 
Additionally, as the Brennan Center has posited, “[o]nly Congress can suspend 
the constitutional guarantee against arbitrary detention, and only under specific, 
narrow circumstances not present” when a federal prisoner is serving a constitu-
tionally suspect sentence.259 The Supreme Court has confirmed this constitutional 
principle on several occasions.260 The Suspension Clause thus applies to federal 
prisoners “with undiminished force.”261 Therefore, “[t]o effectuate the role of the 
Great Writ within the scheme of Separation of Powers [and the Due Process 
Clause] . . . the district court must have power to end [federal prisoners’] unsup-
portable detention.”262 
***** 
A person should serve a sentence within the range Congress prescribed as deter-
mined by the district court after complete consideration of all relevant factors. Not 
only is this consistent with common sense, but is also consistent with constitu-
tional principles. When a sentencing error moves the ceiling or floor, the effect is a 
fundamental defect in the criminal process that the savings clause is designed to 
prevent. Each of these issues were front and center in United States v. Surratt. 
V. THE CASE: RAYMOND SURRATT JR. 
The facts of United States v. Surratt teed up all of the issues discussed above. 
The public was watching this case—another perceived injustice—closely: a 
young, African-American man serving a life sentence for selling drugs that every-
one, including the government and district court, believed was unjust.263 Right 
before the entire Fourth Circuit was going to take a swing, President Barack 
Obama commuted Surratt’s sentence, mooting Surratt’s appeal.264 These facts, 
258. Id. at 765 (“These concerns have particular bearing upon the Suspension Clause question in the 
cases now before us, for the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring 
the separation of powers.”). 
259. Brief for the Association of the Bar of The City of New York, The Brennan Center for Justice at 
the New York University School of Law, the Constitution Project, the Rutherford Institute, and the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, 
Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. 131 (2010) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 1265288, at *8 [hereinafter Brief for 
Brennan Center et al.]. Congress has on four occasions “authorized executive suspension of the writ . . . . 
All such suspensions were accompanied by clear statements expressing congressional intent to suspend 
the writ and limiting the suspension to periods during which the predicate conditions (rebellion or 
invasion) existed.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing DUKER, supra 
note 235, at 149, 178 n.190) (providing justifications for each of the four times the writ was suspended). 
260. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (“[U]nless Congress acts to suspend it, 
the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this 
delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in 
the realm of detentions.”). 
261. Brief for Brennan Center et al., supra note 259, at 8. 
262. Id.; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783 (holding that for the writ to have meaning and fulfill 
its constitutional role, it “must be effective”). 
263. See, e.g., Marimow, supra note 15. 
264. United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 2017) (“By order dated February 14, 2017, 
the court directed the parties to address the impact of the President’s commutation of Appellant Surratt’s 
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however, illustrate the heart of this Article’s argument: any error that alters the 
statutory sentencing range Congress prescribed for punishment—the ceiling or 
the floor—is cognizable under the savings clause. 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Raymond Surratt Jr. was charged with “conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute” crack and powder cocaine in violation of the Controlled Substances 
Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846.265 Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, 
the government filed an information disclosing its intent to seek enhanced penal-
ties based on Surratt’s four previous convictions in North Carolina: “(1) a 1996 
conviction for felony possession of cocaine; (2) a 1997 conviction for felony pos-
session of cocaine; (3) a 1997 conviction for felony possession of cocaine and 
maintaining a place for storage and sale; and (4) a 1998 conviction for sale and 
delivery of cocaine.”266 The maximum sentence Surratt could have received for 
the 1996 and 1997 convictions was eight months for each offense.267 
On February 4, 2005, Surratt pleaded guilty to one count of the conspiracy 
charges.268 The plea agreement specified that Surratt potentially faced a manda-
tory term of life imprisonment because the CSA imposed a statutory minimum 
sentence of life imprisonment for anyone with two or more prior convictions for 
a felony drug offense.269 At his rule 11 hearing270 on February 4, 2005, Surratt 
affirmed to the magistrate judge that he understood how the sentencing guidelines 
might apply to his case, that he might receive a mandatory term of life imprison-
ment, and that if the sentence was more severe than expected, he would be bound 
by his plea.271 
sentence and, in particular, the questions of mootness and jurisdiction. Upon consideration of the 
responses to the court’s order, the court finds this appeal to be moot.”). 
265. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, No. 14- 
6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015). 
266. Id. at 244–45. 
267. Surratt’s June 26, 1996 conviction was for a violation of North Carolina General Statute § 90- 
95(a)(3), a North Carolina Class I felony. See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. 
2255; Alternative Petition for Relief Under 28 U.S.C. 2241; Alternative Petition for Writ of Coram 
Nobis at 3, United States v. Surrat, 445 Fed. App’x 64 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 3:04-cr-00250-RJC) 
[hereinafter Surrat’s Motion to Vacate]. His prior record level under state law was I, meaning the 
maximum punishment he could have received for this conviction was eight months of imprisonment. 
Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-95(a), 15A-1340-17(c), (d) (West 2018). Surratt’s June 27, 
1997 convictions were Class I felonies with a prior record level of II, for which he could receive no more 
than eight months of imprisonment. See Surratt’s Motion to Vacate, supra.; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
15A-1340-17(c), (d) (West 2013). 
268. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:08cv181, 2011 WL 815714, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2011). 
269. See id.; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The statutory mandatory minimum sentences were recently 
lessened by the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a)(2), 132 
Stat. 5194, 5220. 
270. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (detailing the plea procedure in criminal cases). 
271. See Surratt v. United States, No. 3:08cv181, 2011 WL 815714, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2011); 
Surratt, 797 F.3d at 245. 
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At this point, the Fourth Circuit had yet to rule in United States v. Harp, which 
was decided May 4, 2005.272 In Harp—which would later be overturned by 
United States v. Simmons273—the Fourth Circuit considered whether a defend-
ant’s prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana made him 
a career offender subject to an enhanced sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.274 The 
case turned on whether the controlled substance offense was “punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”275 The Fourth Circuit held that a 
prior conviction under North Carolina law qualified as such a felony if the maxi-
mum aggravated sentence that could have been imposed for that crime exceeded 
one year, regardless of whether the sentence actually imposed on the defendant 
was less than one year.276 
Surratt’s sentencing hearing took place in October 2005, by which time Harp 
had been issued.277 Under the CSA, like in Harp, a prior felony drug offense is 
defined as an offense “punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.”278 
The maximum penalty possible for three of Surratt’s prior convictions was only 
eight months each for Surratt in his individual circumstances, but the maximum 
aggravated sentences permissible under North Carolina law were more than one 
year.279 Thus, Harp dictated that all four of Surratt’s previous convictions 
counted as felonies.280 
Surratt’s preliminary sentencing guidelines range was calculated in his presen-
tence report as 188–235 months of imprisonment.281 However, at the time Surratt 
was sentenced, the statutory minimum under the CSA for someone with two or 
more felony drug convictions was life imprisonment.282 Because this mandatory 
minimum was greater than the maximum of the recommended guideline range, 
Surratt’s penalty was a life term.283 At sentencing, the district court stated it “had 
no other option” but to sentence Surratt accordingly, which it did.284 Surratt 
appealed, but the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.285 
272. 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005), overruled by United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
273. 649 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Harp no longer remains good law.”). 
274. Harp, 406 F.3d at 244–45. 
275. Id. at 245 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2004)). 
276. See id. at 246–47. 
277. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 245 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, No. 14- 
6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015). 
278. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) (2012). 
279. See supra note 267. The parties agreed that only the 1998 conviction qualified as a “felony drug 
offense” under the CSA. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en 
banc granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015). 
280. Harp, 406 F.3d at 245. 
281. See United States v. Surratt, 215 F. App’x 222, 223 (4th Cir. 2007). 
282. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012); see also First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 
401(a)(2), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220 (lowering the statutory mandatory minimum). 
283. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004). 
284. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 270 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g 
en banc granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015). 
285. United States v. Surratt, 215 F. App’x 222, 224 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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On April 22, 2008, Surratt filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence under 
section 2255 due to ineffective assistance of counsel.286 He also requested a sen-
tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on amended sentencing 
guidelines application to crack cocaine offenses.287 The district court denied 
Surratt’s petition on February 24, 2011.288 
Six months after the district court denied Surratt’s motion to vacate his sen-
tence, the Fourth Circuit issued Simmons. In Simmons, the Fourth Circuit consid-
ered the same “punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” language in 
the CSA.289 This time the Fourth Circuit held that instead of looking at the maxi-
mum aggravated sentence that could possibly be imposed under North Carolina 
law, the question of whether a prior conviction can be considered a felony 
depended on the “conviction itself.”290 
If Surratt were sentenced for the same CSA violation today, under the Fourth 
Circuit decision in Simmons, his 1996 and 1997 convictions would not qualify as 
felonies and he would not face a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment. 
Because, under Simmons, Surratt possessed only one CSA predicate felony, the 
statutory mandatory minimum for someone with one qualifying offense is not a 
life term, but twenty years.291 Life with the possibility of parole was actually the 
286. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014). 
287. See id. 
288. See id. 
289. United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
290. See id. at 244 (citing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 576 (2010)). 
291. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012). In August 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing 
Act, which amended section 841(b)(1) to reduce the disparity between sentences for powder and crack 
cocaine offenses. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372. 
“The amendment, which remains in effect, responded to both public and judicial outcry regarding the 
‘disproportionate and unjust effect’ of the 100-to-1 powder-to-crack quantity ratio on crack offenders, 
who were disproportionately minorities.” United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(Wynn, J., dissenting from dismissal) (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 93 (2007)); see 
also Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268 (2012) (“[T]he public had come to understand sentences 
embodying the 100-to-1 ratio as reflecting unjustified race-based differences.”); William Spade, Jr., 
Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1266– 
68 (1996) (explaining that implementation of the 100-to-1 ratio led to significantly higher incarceration 
rates for black and Hispanic offenders relative to white offenders and significantly longer sentences for 
black offenders relative to white offenders). 
The Supreme Court held in Dorsey that the Fair Sentencing Act applies retroactively, meaning that 
the statute’s “more lenient mandatory minimums apply to offenders whose unlawful conduct took place 
before, but whose sentencing took place after, the date [the Fair Sentencing] Act took effect.” 567 U.S. 
at 272. As Judge James A. Wynn Jr., explained in his dissent from the Fourth Circuit’s 2017 Surratt 
decision, 
Had the powder-to-crack quantity ratio established by the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect at 
the time of his conviction, [Surratt] would have been sentenced under Section 841(b)(1)(B), 
rather than Section 841(b)(1)(A), because of the Fair Sentencing Act’s revised quantity thresh-
old for receiving the higher mandatory minimums set forth in Section 841(b)(1)(A). 
855 F.3d at 223 (Wynn, J., dissenting from dismissal) (alteration in original) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(A), (B)). Under Section 841(b)(1)(B), because Surratt only had one predicate felony 
drug offense, he would face a mandatory minimum term of ten years of imprisonment, not life. 
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). 
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statutory maximum.292 Surratt, however, was sentenced to a mandatory minimum 
term of life imprisonment. 
B. SURRATT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS SENTENCE 
On August 15, 2012, Surratt filed a motion in the district court to vacate his 
sentence under section 2255 and section 2241.293 Surratt argued that he was enti-
tled to relief under section 2255 because, in light of Simmons, his sentence was 
not authorized by law.294 In those proceedings, the government agreed that 
Surratt was entitled to resentencing under section 2255(e) and section 2241, argu-
ing that Surratt was not eligible for the aggravated sentence he received.295 
On April 7, 2014, the district court held a hearing on Surratt’s motion and 
acknowledged that it would have imposed less than a life sentence at the original 
sentencing hearing if it had the authority to do so.296 The district judge stated, “I 
was required to impose a life sentence,” as well as “I’ll not forget the frustration I 
felt in doing that because I did think it was an unjust sentence.”297 The court fur-
ther stated that its “inability” to consider the possibility of a lesser sentence 
“based on all relevant evidence has troubled the Court to this day.”298 
Nevertheless, the court denied Surratt’s motion, holding that the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in In re Jones precluded any relief for sentencing errors.299 
Jones involved a slightly different challenge under section 2255(e) and section 
2241. Jones had been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for using a firearm 
during the commission of a drug offense, “based on the discovery of four firearms 
in a locked closet.”300 After his first section 2255 motion, the Supreme Court 
decided Bailey v. United States, which held that the government must prove 
“active employment” to establish “use” of a firearm under the statute.301 Without 
a new, retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law, this change in statutory 
interpretation did not satisfy the requirements for a successive petition under sec-
tion 2255(h), so Jones invoked the savings clause of section 2255(e), arguing that 
section 2255 was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his deten-
tion.”302 The Fourth Circuit agreed, especially because “Bailey establishes that a 
prisoner whose conviction rests on an improper definition of ‘use’ is incarcerated  
292. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
293. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *3 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014). 
294. Id. at *3, *6. 
295. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 270 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g 
en banc granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015) (“Both parties agree that Surratt is ineligible to 
spend the rest of his life in prison.”). 
296. See Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *3 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 
2014). 
297. Surratt, 797 F.3d at 273 (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
298. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014). 
299. Id. at *6. 
300. In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 334 (4th Cir. 2000). 
301. 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995). 
302. Jones, 226 F.3d at 329 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012)). 
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for conduct that is not criminal.”303 The Fourth Circuit therefore concluded that 
section 2255 is “inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction” 
when three criteria are met: 
(1) [A]t the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court 
established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s 
direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that 
the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; 
and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 
because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.304 
Citing this three-part test, the district court held that Surratt could not satisfy 
the second requirement: that the substantive law changed such that the conduct 
for which Surratt was convicted was no longer criminal.305 Ultimately the district 
court found it was “not at liberty to deviate” from Jones and could not recognize 
“something less than decriminalized conduct [to] support[] proceeding through 
the savings clause portal to section 2241 relief.”306 The court further found that 
due process is not violated by preventing a defendant from invoking the savings 
clause to “remedy a sentence based on a mandatory minimum punishment later 
deemed invalid.”307 Surratt appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Because both parties 
agreed that the savings clause permitted Surratt to challenge his unlawful sen-
tence, the Fourth Circuit appointed an amicus to present any other potential inter-
pretations of the savings clause.308 
On appeal, a divided panel309 of the Fourth Circuit concluded that “§ 2255(e)’s 
text does not permit Surratt to raise his claim under section 2241.”310 
Specifically, the majority denied Surratt’s section 2241 petition because he 
was not actually of the underlying conviction and could not—“absent verbal 
and logical gymnastics”— be “actually innocent” of a sentence enhance-
ment.311 The majority left open the possibility that section 2241 could support 
a prisoner’s challenge to a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, but 
found this exception inapplicable because Surratt’s sentence was lawful—the 
303. Id. at 333. 
304. Id. at 333–34. 
305. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *5 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014). 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at *9. 
308. United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, No. 14-6851 
(4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015). 
309. Judge Gregory issued a scathing and well-reasoned dissent. Judge Gregory anchored his 
argument on the history and text of the “Great Writ,” tracked the impact of legislation on it, and then 
applied those principles and Fourth Circuit precedent to determine that the majority’s holding violates 
them all. Id. at 270–76 (Gregory, J., dissenting). The core of his argument resides in the constitutional 
prohibition on suspension of the writ. See id. Judge Gregory analyzed the text, applying “the traditional 
savings clause analysis” (the analysis set out in Jones) to show why section 2255 is “inadequate or 
ineffective” and why section 2241 is available to address a misapplied enhancement. Id. at 273–76. 
310. Id. at 251 (majority opinion). 
311. Id. at 249–50. 
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statutory maximum sentence authorized for Surratt’s conviction was life 
imprisonment, which his mandatory minimum life sentence did not exceed.312 
Surratt was thus barred from seeking habeas relief under section 2241 for a 
misapplied mandatory minimum life sentence.313 
Surratt petitioned the Fourth Circuit to rehear the case en banc; the court 
granted his request and vacated the panel decision.314 The en banc argument 
occurred on March 23, 2016.315 However, “[o]n January 19, 2017—nearly 
10 months after the rehearing en banc, and still without a decision from [the Fourth 
Circuit]—[President Obama] commuted [Surratt’s] life sentence to a 200-month 
term of imprisonment.”316 Surratt’s “commutation was part of a broader effort by 
the President to commute the sentences of inmates sentenced in accordance with 
the severe mandatory minimums and unjust powder-to-crack quantity ratio appli-
cable under the earlier version of Section 841(b)(1).”317 
***** 
Although there is an ongoing debate about whether the President’s pardon 
mooted Surratt’s appeal,318 there should be no debate that Surratt was entitled to 
relief via the savings clause, at least under this Article’s interpretation of that 
clause. 
C. SURRATT WAS ENTITLED TO HABEAS RELIEF 
Under this Article’s interpretation of the savings clause, Surratt was entitled to 
habeas relief because section 2255 was inadequate or ineffective to test the legal-
ity of his sentence. Surratt’s claim relied on a retroactively applicable decision of 
statutory interpretation, was foreclosed by binding precedent at the time of his 
initial section 2255 motion, and involved a fundamental defect. The first two 
conditions—retroactivity and foreclosure—are easily satisfied here. Simmons 
was decided on August 17, 2011, after Surratt’s direct appeal and his first section 
2255 motion were filed on April 22, 2008.319 Simmons, declared retroactive by 
Miller v. United States,320 is a case about statutory interpretation—namely, the inter-
pretation of federal sentencing law—not constitutional law. Therefore, Surratt 
312. Id. at 255–57, 269. 
313. Id. at 269. 
314. Id. at 240. 
315. United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 218 (4th Cir. 2017). 
316. Id. at 224 (Wynn, J., dissenting from dismissal). 
317. Id. 
318. See id. at 221. In his dissent from dismissal, Judge Wynn argued that, because Surratt still has a 
“concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation” and because the Court could grant 
effectual relief, the case was not moot. Id. at 225–27. Specifically, Judge Wynn contended that Surratt 
would likely face a shorter sentence than the one imposed by the commutation. Id. at 232. Judge 
Wilkinson disagreed, stating that “[t]he President’s commutation order simply closes the judicial door.” 
Id. at 219 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (alteration in original). 
319. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014); 
United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 237 (4th Cir. 2011). 
320. 735 F.3d 141, 147 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Simmons announced a new substantive rule that is 
retroactive on collateral review . . . .”). 
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cannot take advantage of a second or successive petition through section 2255(h). In 
other words, Surratt never “had an unobstructed procedural shot at filing a § 2255 
motion to take advantage of” the change brought about by Simmons.321 
In addition, the error is of constitutional magnitude. The Simmons error in 
Surratt’s case took away the floor of his sentencing range and tied the hands of 
the district court such that it was prevented from fashioning an individualized 
sentence within the legally correct range intended by Congress. This raises the se-
rious and significant separation of powers and due process concerns discussed in 
Part IV that established the fundamental character defect in Surratt’s case. 
Any suggestion that Surratt’s sentence is legal because it is within the applica-
ble statutory maximum—as the majority did in Surratt—is, as in Hicks v. 
Oklahoma, no more than a “frail conjecture” that cannot support “[s]uch an arbi-
trary disregard of the petitioner’s right to liberty.”322 Indeed, the conjecture is 
even less substantial in Surratt’s case than in Hicks because the district court 
made clear that it believes Surratt’s life sentence to be “unjust” and would not 
have imposed it but for the erroneous belief that it was compelled to do so by the 
statutory mandatory minimum. More importantly, the Supreme Court in Hicks 
found a due process violation even though the resulting sentence was “within the 
range of punishment that could have been imposed in any event.”323 
Surratt’s case is important because it underscores what is at stake: years of 
Surratt’s life would have wasted away in prison serving the “penultimate”324 sen-
tence because the Fourth Circuit wrongly interpreted the sentencing statute 
involved in his case. Even worse, the Fourth Circuit in its initial panel decision 
would have allowed Surratt no relief, the same result the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits would reach. Surratt’s “long-final” sentence, according to these 
courts, “must remain just that: final.”325 But, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held, the finality principle—the notion that at some point the criminal justice pro-
cess has to come to an end—“must yield to the imperative of correcting a funda-
mentally unjust incarceration.”326 Finality, in other words, should never be 
elevated over the legal rule that people should not be in prison because of an 
unlawful conviction or sentence. 
Yet, these courts take refuge behind the finality principle, which, consequently, 
deprives federal prisoners “of the most basic liberties” and strips away all hope of 
321. Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010). 
322. See 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 245 
(1998) (“[Because a] mandatory minimum can . . . ‘mandate a minimum sentence of imprisonment more 
than twice as severe as the maximum the trial judge would otherwise have imposed’ . . . . the risk of 
unfairness to a particular defendant is no less, and may well be greater, when a mandatory minimum 
sentence, rather than a permissive maximum sentence, is at issue.” (citations omitted) (quoting 
McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
323. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 345 (footnote omitted). 
324. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). 
325. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 2011). 
326. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982). For the reasons stated in supra note 37, the finality 
principle, in my view, is not frustrated under this Article’s proposal. 
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restoration, “except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of 
which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”327 This result is—and 
will always be—an extraordinary miscarriage of justice of constitutional propor-
tions. In these cases, courts “must allow a prisoner to invoke the savings clause if 
the Great Writ, which has always been ‘a bulwark against convictions that violate 
fundamental fairness,’ is to mean anything at all.”328 This Article’s proposal pro-
vides a bright-line test that is consistent with the text of the savings clause, pro-
vides clarity, upholds our constitutional values, and, most importantly, ensures 
that justice will be served. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s interpretive framework, if adopted, will certainly require 
courts to review more cases. But these are precisely the cases courts must 
review to give people the confidence that the criminal justice system is working 
fairly. When courts correct their own mistakes concerning statutory interpreta-
tion, and that correction exposes a fundamental defect in sentencing—any 
error that alters the statutory range Congress prescribed for punishment— 
courts must address that issue head on. The mechanism to do so is the savings 
clause—the clause that should ensure that federal prisoners are not serving 
unlawful sentences and that justice is done. And, there is no basis—not in text 
or through any canons of interpretation—to deny federal prisoners access to 
the courts through the savings clause. The criminal justice process, after all, 
should never “rest at a point where it ought properly never to repose.”329  
327. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 (2010). 
328. United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 270 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 126), reh’g granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. 2015). 
329. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
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